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ABSTRACT 
The Fukushima nuclear plant meltdown offers an unusual opportunity to examine and 
learn from Japan’s experience managing the forced, extended relocation of over 100,000 
people. The objective of this study was to assess lessons the United States can 
incorporate into its disaster management plans from Japan’s experience managing the 
relocation of communities due to the widespread contamination from the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear plant. Four years after the catastrophe, Fukushima Prefecture estimates 
119,000 residents are still living in temporary accommodations while remediation work 
continues in 11 municipalities.  
This comparative analysis of the Fukushima case approached the challenge of 
planning for recovery after a nuclear/radiological disaster from the perspective of 
managers with limited radiation management expertise. It examined the progress of 
recovery in the first four years and the management practices related to the relocation and 
resettlement of the most contaminated Fukushima communities. The primary 
recommendation is that states and communities require guidance and tools to use both to 
prepare for major radiological incidents and as post-incident job aids for managing 
disaster recovery. Leaders and planners will be able to apply the study’s detailed 
recommendations to enhance efforts to prepare for the intermediate and late-phase 
recovery from radiological disasters. 
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Nana korobi ya oki—Fall seven times, stand up eight. 
—Japanese proverb 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Four years later, Japan is still struggling to recover from the triple disaster of 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear plant meltdown that struck March 11, 2011. Any one of 
these disasters would have challenged seasoned leaders with a well-designed disaster 
management system. The disruption and uncertainty unleashed by the widespread 
releases of significant radiological contamination from the Fukushima Daiichi plant has 
added layers of complexity few leaders are prepared to navigate. Fukushima Prefecture 
estimates nearly 46,000 residents are still living in other prefectures and at least 73,000 
are in temporary accommodations elsewhere in Fukushima. The villages of Okuma, 
Futuba, and Namie stand virtually empty and may remain off limits for a decade or more.  
The United States is home to 100 licensed nuclear power plants and numerous 
active fault lines. What if there were a major accident at one of those plants with 
significant offsite impacts? What if there were a terrorist attack using an improvised 
nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device that resulted in widespread 
contamination? Are we prepared to manage the abrupt displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of people who will not be able to return for years or decades? 
U.S. plans and exercises for nuclear/radiological disasters are all based on 
theoretical scenarios with very little recent practical experience to support them. The 
potential lessons for the U.S. in examining Japan’s progress of ensuring the health and 
livelihoods of its residents, cleaning up the contamination, reversing the blow to its 
already dragging economy, rebuilding, and resettling are innumerable. Most scholarly 
articles and books published thus far about Japan’s nuclear disaster focus primarily on 
early decision making, noting the difficulties the government had reacting to the extreme 
challenges of the situation, but not yet assessing decisions and outcomes beyond the first 
year—the recovery. 
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This study examines the progress of recovery in the first four years and the 
management practices and decisions related to the relocation and resettlement of the most 
contaminated Fukushima communities. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The objective of this thesis is to address the following primary research question: 
what lessons can the U.S. incorporate into its disaster management plans from Japan’s 
experience managing the relocation of communities due to the widespread contamination 
from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant? The Fukushima disaster offers an unusual 
opportunity to examine and learn from the experience of Japan, Fukushima Prefecture, 
and the affected municipalities. The Japan disaster is a useful comparative study since 
Japan is similar to the U.S. in key ways: it is a modern, developed country; it has a 
sophisticated building code and disaster management system; and its governmental 
structure is democratic and includes executive and legislative branches (parliamentary) 
with responsibilities divided between national, prefectural, and municipal levels. 
C. METHOD 
This comparative analysis of the Fukushima case approaches the challenge of 
planning for recovery after a nuclear/radiological disaster from the perspective of 
managers with limited if any health physics or other radiation management expertise. It 
synthesizes aspects of nuclear/radiological preparedness and disaster recovery planning 
and management that are typically addressed separately. 
To compile the case, the author collected and reviewed over 400 source 
documents available from the Japanese central government, Fukushima Prefecture, the 
affected municipalities, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), nongovernmental 
organizations, and the media. In addition, the author reviewed numerous scholarly 
articles and books published regarding the 2011 disaster as well as the Three Mile Island 
and Chernobyl nuclear accidents. The author compared lessons derived from the case to 
the disaster management policies, plans, and experience in the United States in order to 
assess potential effectiveness and applicability and to make recommendations. 
xvii 
D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A surprising finding is that although an official recommendation to financially 
assist property owners to permanently move out of “difficult to return” zones was made 
in early 2012, it took over a year before implementation began and even longer for the 
central government to fully and publicly embrace such a policy. It is clear that local and 
state officials in the U.S. will also not be eager to assist taxpaying residents move 
elsewhere and give up on the community’s future. This is a heart wrenching situation for 
which there are no easy solutions. 
The study concludes with a set of planning recommendations for U.S. 
nuclear/radiological disaster recovery managers and five topics to highlight for future 
research. Leaders and planners will be able to apply the recommendations in the final 
chapter to enhance efforts to prepare for the intermediate and late phase recovery from 
radiological disasters. 
The primary recommendation is that guidance and tools for states and 
communities to use both to prepare for and as post incident job aids for managing disaster 
recovery after major radiological incidents is lacking and necessary. Managing public 
information and stakeholder involvement is the most critical capability to develop 
because it affects all other aspects of recovery and is the best tool for empowering 
survivors. Guidance and job aids for the intermediate and late phase (recovery) are all the 
more critical since community preparedness in advance is likely to be limited. Local and 
state governments will be at the center of the maelstrom if a significant radiological 
disaster happens here. They will be managing the recovery—and they will need help. 
Additionally, the federal government and Congress should review the 
mechanisms available to support communities, individuals, and businesses in such a 
situation. Particularly for nuclear power plant accidents governed by the Price-Anderson 
Act, the compensation system, which requires first court intervention and then 
congressional intervention almost guarantees delayed assistance and aggravation for 
survivors. 
Now is the moment for us to stand up the eighth time. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Cherry blossoms in Namie fall without being loved 
—from a poem by Minoru Ikeda,  
retired letter carrier and decontamination worker1 
 
Despite the devastating toll of lives lost to the tsunami that followed the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, the defining element of the catastrophe is the cascading failure of 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and subsequent release of high levels of radiation 
throughout the Prefecture and beyond. Four years later, after initial worldwide headlines 
and footage of boats and helicopters spraying water at the smoldering plant have faded, 
just under 119,000 Fukushima residents are still evacuated and living in temporary 
accommodations.2 The villages of Okuma, Futuba, and Namie stand virtually empty and 
may remain off limits for a decade or more.  
Community leaders managing the aftermath of a complex disaster like the 
Fukushima meltdown can be overwhelmed. The best antidote to this is planning and 
preparedness, not just for the emergency response, but for managing the recovery and 
reconstruction. Large disasters frequently involve extended temporary relocations of 
residents and businesses. A disaster involving radiological contamination adds a new 
dimension of complexity to the ability of communities to manage the recovery. People 
will be fearful and skeptical. Surrounding jurisdictions will be inundated with displaced 
residents seeking housing and work, putting a strain on local infrastructure and public 
services that will last years. The usual procedures and systems for clearing and disposing 
of disaster debris will be completely inadequate. 
What if a nuclear plant accident or a terrorist attack using nuclear materials 
caused widespread contamination here in the U.S.? Are we prepared to manage the 
                                                 
1 Kentaro Isomura, “Decontamination Worker Moved by What He Saw Writes Poetry in Fukushima,” 
The Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/recovery/AJ201405280003  
2 “No. of Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Evacuees Drops below 120,000,” Fukushima Minpo News, 
February 13, 2015. http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=469  
2 
abrupt relocations and recovery after an event that may displace whole communities for 
years, possibly a decade or more? 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This objective of this thesis is to address the following primary research question: 
what lessons can the U.S. incorporate into its disaster management plans from Japan’s 
experience managing the relocation of communities due to the widespread contamination 
from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant? In order to fully explore the main research 
question, the thesis applies a qualitative, comparative analysis of the following ancillary 
questions: 
1. What were the timelines of decision making related to managing the 
relocation of communities due to the contamination from the Fukushima 
Daiichi plant? 
2. What were the situational, political, geographical, or cultural contexts that 
affected how decisions were made?  
3. Are there examples of policies and actions undertaken by the Japanese that 
were successful? Are there examples with poor outcomes or side effects?  
4. What cultural and political differences between the U.S. and Japan might 
impact how well the identified lessons might apply in the U.S. disaster 
management context? 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
In 2015, Japan is still struggling to recover from the triple disaster of earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear plant meltdown that struck March 11, 2011. Fukushima Prefecture 
estimates nearly 46,000 residents are living in other prefectures and at least 73,000 are in 
temporary accommodations elsewhere in Fukushima.3 Reviewing Japan’s progress in 
ensuring the health of its residents, cleaning up the contamination, reversing the blow to 
its already dragging economy, rebuilding, and resettling, the potential lessons in 
catastrophic disaster recovery management are innumerable. 
The Japan disaster has garnered lots of attention from the media, academic 
researchers, and interested organizations. The Fukushima recovery is still unfolding and 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
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thus far the scholarly literature focuses primarily on early response decision making, 
noting the difficulties the government had reacting to the extreme challenges of the 
emergency situation, but not yet assessing decisions and outcomes beyond the first few 
months—the recovery.  
The U.S. is home to 100 licensed nuclear power plants and numerous active fault 
lines. What if there were a major accident at one of those plants with significant offsite 
impacts? The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as part of its post-Fukushima lessons 
learned initiative, required nuclear power plant operators to conduct re-evaluations of 
their integrated plans to include beyond design based external events, as well as flood and 
seismic vulnerabilities. These efforts will serve to reduce risk but cannot eliminate it. 
What if there were a terrorist attack using an improvised nuclear device or a radiological 
dispersal device that resulted in widespread contamination? U.S. plans and exercises for 
nuclear/radiological disasters are all based on theoretical scenarios, with very little recent 
practical experience to support them. 
The Fukushima disaster offers an unusual opportunity to examine and learn from 
the experience of Japan, Fukushima Prefecture, and the affected municipalities. The 
Japan experience offers the opportunity to sketch out realistic expected situational factors 
for recovery scenarios for planners and leaders to work through the complex issues, 
uncertainties, and decision points they may one day face after a radiological disaster.  
The Japan disaster is a useful comparative study since Japan is similar to the U.S. 
in key ways: it is a modern, developed country; it has a sophisticated building code and 
disaster management system; and its governmental structure is democratic and includes 
executive and legislative branches (parliamentary) with responsibilities divided between 
national, prefectural, and municipal levels. Unfolding during the Internet age, the 
technological tools and forms of public media employed during the Fukushima recovery 
are current and relevant for today’s disaster managers. 
The focus for this study is to evaluate the decision making regarding management 
of the relocation and resettlement of communities (residents, businesses, municipal 
services) due to the radiological contamination. Some of the major recovery management 
4 
factors include: public messaging regarding potential health impacts, relocation logistics, 
and available assistance; preparing host communities to receive and support displaced 
residents; assisting residents to maintain or re-establish livelihoods; ensuring physical and 
mental health of residents; ensuring continuity of critical infrastructure and other key 
community services; and orchestrating decontamination and waste disposal work.  
The initial hypothesis of this study is that the original overarching policy direction 
in Japan would not be a workable solution in the U.S., though a number of individual 
Japanese disaster management practices will provide useful models. It appears that Japan 
has chosen to extend the temporary relocation period, undertake aggressive 
decontamination, and eventually resettle residents in even the most contaminated areas. 
The study considers the implications of a policy option to facilitate permanent relocation 
of residents and businesses out of the most severely contaminated zones at an earlier 
point, even if it may be possible to reclaim the area years later. The U.S. has more land 
suitable for redevelopment for permanent relocation sites than Japan. Culturally, U.S. 
residents may tend to be more transient and less tied to specific geographic locations than 
the Japanese people. 
C. SUMMARY OF METHOD 
This comparative analysis of the Fukushima case approaches the challenge of 
planning for recovery after a nuclear/radiological disaster from the perspective of 
managers with limited if any health physics or other radiation management expertise. 
Community leaders and disaster recovery managers and planners tend not to be radiation 
experts. As with response plans, the expectation is generally that one of the many 
functions radiation experts will provide when plugged into the larger disaster 
management organizational structure, is provide technical advice to the overall disaster 
leadership team. Knowing that expertise will be there is a comfort to disaster managers, 
but ideally their training and preparedness should include basic understanding of the 
unique impacts and challenges a nuclear/radiological disaster would pose.  
To compile the case, the author collected and reviewed over 400 source 
documents available from the Japanese central government, Fukushima Prefecture, the 
5 
affected municipalities, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), nongovernmental 
organizations, and the media. In addition, the author reviewed scholarly articles and 
books published regarding the 2011 disaster. The author compared lessons derived from 
the case to the disaster management policies, plans, and experience in the United States in 
order to assess effectiveness and applicability and to make recommendations. 
Recovery management after a catastrophic disaster involves many facets and 
complexities. This study touches on a wide range of issues, but focuses on 
communication with and assistance to residents and management of the community 
relocations.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
Most scholarly articles and books published thus far about Japan’s nuclear 
disaster focus primarily on early decision making, noting the difficulties the government 
had reacting to the extreme challenges of the situation, but not yet assessing decisions 
and outcomes beyond the first year. This thesis synthesizes aspects of 
nuclear/radiological preparedness and disaster recovery planning and management that 
are typically addressed separately. The Fukushima recovery is still unfolding and much 
more will be written about this disaster in years to come. This research provides an early 
analysis of the progress of supporting displaced populations, reestablishing relocated 
communities, and the effectiveness of recovery assistance efforts. 
The product of this research is intended to be practical—carefully considered 
lessons that will serve as a foundation for future support and guidance for states and 
communities to prepare for recovery after major radiological disasters. 
E. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Following the Introduction, this thesis includes five additional chapters. Chapter 
II reviews the major literature related to management of radiological disaster recovery, 
the Chernobyl nuclear disaster recovery as a reference point, and risk communication 
related to radiation hazards. The third chapter describes the study methodology in more 
detail. The Fukushima disaster case is organized in thematic sections in Chapter IV. The 
6 
fifth chapter identifies and assesses key practices and lessons derived from the 
Fukushima case, and then compares them to the U.S. situation for applicability. A 
surprising finding is that although an official recommendation to financially assist 
property owners to permanently move out of “difficult to return” zones was made in early 
2012, it took over a year before implementation began and even longer for the central 
government to fully and publicly embrace such a policy.  
The author’s recommendations for adopting lessons for U.S. disaster recovery 
planning efforts as well as areas for future study are outlined in Chapter VI. The primary 
recommendation is that guidance and tools for states and communities to use both to 
prepare for and as post incident job aids for managing disaster recovery after major 
radiological incidents is lacking and necessary. Managing public information and 
stakeholder involvement is the most critical capability to develop because it affects all 
other aspects of recovery and is the best tool for empowering survivors. 
7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature related to the recovery phase of managing nuclear/radiological 
disaster impacts is, not surprisingly, heavily influenced by the Chernobyl experience. 
Over the 29 years since the Chernobyl disaster, a robust literature tracing its impacts and 
legacy has developed. Scientists have taken advantage of the opportunity to monitor and 
assess the long term health impacts of radiation exposure, the psychological effects to the 
surrounding population, the nature of the radioactive decay over time, and many other 
technical aspects pertinent to managing radiological contamination. To assess the need 
for further research related to managing recovery after radiological disasters, this review 
concentrates on three major categories of relevant literature. The first section directs 
readers to recent literature providing comprehensive treatment of recovery phase 
radiological disaster management. The next section discusses the recovery after 
Chernobyl, in particular the long term implications of the population relocations as a 
protective action. Because public information is a critical core capability for managers 
implementing relocations to protect the population, the final section examines the 
applicable risk communication literature. 
A. NUCLEAR/RADIOLOGICAL RECOVERY PLANNING AND 
MANAGEMENT 
The national and international associations and organizations devoted to research, 
education, and information sharing related to radiation management and protection are an 
invaluable source for reports and articles documenting impacts and results of protective 
actions, as well as recommendations for improving standards, programs, and disaster 
management. Those frequently cited in radiological incident management literature 
include the Health Physics Society, which publishes the peer reviewed journal Health 
Physics; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent 
intergovernmental scientific and technical organization of the United Nations that 
publishes reports and standards; the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(ICRP), an independent nonprofit that publishes reports and recommendations focusing 
on protection from ionizing radiation; the International Radiation Protection Association 
8 
(IRPA), a professional society that promotes radiation protection through education and 
publications; the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), a 
congressionally chartered nonprofit corporation, which publishes a series of reports and 
commentaries; and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation (UNSCEAR). Through collaborative committees and workgroups of scientific, 
technical, and professional members, the publications of these organizations are typically 
regarded as the most comprehensive and credible sources for radiation management 
information and advice. 
In December 2014, the NCRP published its long awaited report No. 175, Decision 
Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Major Nuclear or Radiological Incidents. The 
committee had begun its work on recovery after radiological terrorism prior to the 
Fukushima disaster and afterwards added nuclear accidents to its agenda. This advisory 
report emphasizes the importance of local, state, and national plans addressing late phase 
issues and decision making processes in concert with emergency response requirements. 
Radiation professionals typically divide radiation incident management actions into three 
phases. The early or emergency phase lasts from the onset of an incident throughout the 
plume passage. During this time, actual environmental radiation measurements will be 
limited and incident management is focused on shelter in place or evacuation, rescue, and 
life saving medical response. The intermediate phase is characterized by the stabilization 
of radioactive releases and the ability to characterize the release and monitor radiation 
levels. Depending on the environmental readings, protective action guides may call for 
additional measures such as food restrictions and temporary relocations to reduce dose 
through contaminated food or water and external exposure. When the situation allows for 
remediation and other restoration actions, the late phase is underway and may continue 
for years or decades.4  
The NCRP committee discusses and promotes the concept of “optimization” 
rather than a flat, set standard for radiation contamination clean up after a radiological 
                                                 
4 National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Decision Making for Late-Phase 
Recovery from Major Nuclear or Radiological Incidents (Bethesda, MD: National Council on Radiation 
Protection and Measurements, 2014), 17.  
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disaster. As NCRP describes it, optimization builds on the “as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA) principle” to guide decisions through a stakeholder engagement 
process that weighs the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs involved with the various methods 
of reducing dose exposure. It discusses existing ICRP and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) guidance and the importance of stakeholder involvement in decision 
making related to cleanup standards and planning.5  
The “how clean is clean” issue has plagued radiological disaster planning for 
decades. These concepts build on evaluations of the merits and drawbacks to various 
population protection measures in the late phase. For example, in their 1995 article 
drawing heavily on interviews and studies conducted after the Chernobyl accident, 
Lochard and Pretre emphasize the concept of the acceptability of countermeasures in 
relation to the perception of risk for the involved population, which will naturally vary 
with circumstances. They conclude that the most difficult decisions relate to those areas 
of more moderate risk that require significant changes in daily routine over long 
periods—as opposed the highest risk areas where drastic measures are more obviously 
necessary.6  
Report No. 175 stands out among radiation protection publications for its 
attention to harmonizing general disaster resilience and recovery planning with traditional 
emergency and technical radiation management guidance. Throughout, it intertwines 
detailed radiation management methodologies with general resilience and recovery 
preparedness guidance points from sources such as: the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework; the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) A Whole 
Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for 
Action; FEMA’s Long Term Community Recovery Planning Process: A Self-Help Guide; 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 18–20.  
6 Jacques Lochard, and Serge Prêtre, “Return to Normality after a Radiological Emergency,” Health 
Physics 68, no. 1 (1995): 21–26.  
10 
and the work of the Community and Regional Resilience Institute, among others.7 The 
report includes detailed appendices describing the long term impacts, protective actions, 
and late phase measures for the major nuclear/radiological incidents around the world, 
including Fukushima and Chernobyl. 
B. CHERNOBYL RECOVERY 
Perhaps the easiest way to put the first four years of community recovery after the 
Fukushima disaster in context is to read about the fate of villages and residents 
surrounding the Chernobyl plant. The accident was spurred by an ill-conceived safety test 
that led to an explosion and a raging graphite fire in the unit 4 reactor in the early 
morning hours of April 26, 1986.8 Authorities evacuated the 45,000 residents of the town 
of Pripyat, two miles away, beginning the afternoon of April 27 and an additional 90,000 
people from surrounding villages by May 31.9 Former Soviet official Grigori Medvedev 
describes an almost surreal scene of a slow onset evacuation, with poorly informed 
residents continuing to spend time outdoors right up until the buses arrived. Yet since 
naïve officials assumed the evacuation would be of short duration, they told residents to 
bring little and simply close windows and doors and turn off the gas. Within days, 
radioactive particles passed through cracks and covered all surfaces.10  
Later, officials relocated additional villages in Ukraine and Belarus, resulting in 
hundreds of thousands of people displaced permanently. The catastrophe resulted in 
                                                 
7 National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Decision Making for Late-Phase 
Recovery; Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Disaster Recovery Framework (Washington, 
DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011), http://www.fema.gov/national-disaster-recovery-
framework; Federal Emergency Management Agency, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency 
Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2011), https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/23781; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Long Term Community Recovery Planning Process: A Self-Help Guide 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005), https://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/6337; Community and Regional Resilience Institute, “Resilient Communities,” 
accessed January 22, 2015, http://www.resilientus.org/ 
8 Grigori Medvedev, The Truth about Chernobyl, trans. Evelyn Rossiter (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1991), 46–77.  
9 David R. Marples, “The Chernobyl Disaster: Its Effect on Belarus and Ukraine,” in Long Road to 
Recovery; Community Responses to Industrial Disaster, ed. James K. Mitchell (United Nations University 
Press, 1996), 190.  
10 Medvedev, The Truth about Chernobyl, 181–188.  
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widespread, enduring psychological distress, 6,000 documented cases of thyroid cancer 
in children, extensive environmental contamination, and profound economic disruption 
throughout the region.11 Nearly thirty years later, the disaster is not fully resolved. The 
sunken, molten reactor core continues to be a threat to the water table that supplies the 
city of Kiev. The hastily built sarcophagus from 1986 is deteriorating, so an international 
consortium of donors is paying for a multi-billion dollar dome cover to replace it.12 
It is difficult to compare the Soviet information management efforts after 
Chernobyl to public information expectations in the U.S. or Japan. Soviet officials waited 
two full days before publicly acknowledging the accident had happened at all. Children 
attended school and played in the streets the next day. Five days after the accident, the 
May Day parade continued as scheduled in nearby Kiev. Public statements continually 
reassured residents that radiation levels were improving though specific numbers were 
rarely offered. Official maps of the estimated fallout were first released years later. The 
official number of deaths stands at 31, but this number is disputed and later deaths are 
difficult to attribute.13  
David R. Marples, historian and Ukraine/Belarus specialist at the University of 
Alberta, has written extensively about the impacts of the Chernobyl disaster. He 
published The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster in 1988 and later contributed a 
chapter about the effect of the Chernobyl disaster on Belarus and Ukraine in James K. 
Mitchell’s The Long Road to Recovery: Community Responses to Industrial Disaster in 
1996.14 Marples describes the gradual rise of local victim action groups and involvement 
of international organizations to assist the survivors and the governments of the Ukraine, 
                                                 
11 United Nations Development Programme, The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Accident: A Strategy for Recovery (New York: United Nations, 2002), 
http://www.un.org/ha/chernobyl/docs/report.pdf, 28–32; Vladimir A. Kirichenko, Alexander V. 
Kirichenko, and Day E. Werts, “Consequences and Countermeasures in a Nuclear Power Accident: 
Chernobyl Experience,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 3 
(2012): 317.   
12 Henry Fountain, “Chernobyl: Capping a Catastrophe,” New York Times, April 27, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/27/science/chernobyl-capping-a-catastrophe.html  
13 Marples, “The Chernobyl Disaster,” 189–193.  
14 David R. Marples, The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster (London: Macmillan Press, 1988); 
Marples, “The Chernobyl Disaster,” 183–230.  
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Russia, and Belarus. Though clearly wary of the IAEA as an organization devoted both to 
nuclear safety and the advancement of nuclear power, he outlines the invaluable 
assistance the organization provided as it delicately managed a tentative relationship with 
Soviet officials.15 His recommendations for improved response and early recovery 
actions for nuclear accidents are consistent with current preparedness protocols for 
nuclear plants and surrounding jurisdictions.16 
One example of the continuous flow of international support is the Chernobyl 
Forum. IAEA initiated the Forum in 2002 in cooperation with several United Nations 
subcomponents, the World Bank, and the governments of Belarus, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine. The Forum published its report in 2006: Chernobyl’s Legacy: 
Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the 
Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The report reviews the 
long-term health, social, and economic impacts from Chernobyl and the countermeasures 
enacted afterwards. Because of successful countermeasures, the primary health impacts to 
the general population have been limited to a significant increase in thyroid cancer 
among exposed children and widespread psychological distress.17 
Drawing heavily from a 2002 report of the United Nations Development 
Programme, the Chernobyl Forum team estimates more than 350,000 people relocated 
from the most contaminated areas of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Most of those were 
forced to move several years after the accident. The relocations have had significant, 
rippling and lasting social impacts on the villagers involved. Though the government paid 
compensation and provided free housing, many people remain deeply unhappy about 
being compelled to move and the loss of control over their lives. Studies indicate those 
who stayed or went back despite official bans have coped better psychologically than 
those forced to move. The populations in the affected areas are disproportionately aged 
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since many younger people moved away voluntarily. With a limited workforce, it has 
been difficult to retain adequate services to support communities.18 
The financial strain on the governments was still acute at the time of the 
Chernobyl Forum report in 2006. Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia were still providing 
compensation related to the Chernobyl impacts for approximately seven million people at 
that time. The governments were not able to sustain the plans to develop resettlement 
communities, leaving unfinished homes and empty public facilities in some locations. 
The team describes a “dependency culture” that grew among the inflated rolls of people 
used to receiving the Chernobyl compensation benefits. Stuck in an environment with 
few other economic prospects, the reliance on the government payments has stymied the 
natural capacity of the population to lead its own recovery.19 
The Chernobyl Forum report recommends refocusing limited resources to provide 
targeted assistance to those who suffered true health impacts due to Chernobyl, 
redesigning social and economic programs to address the broader community needs, and 
helping those able to manage on their own to do so. The report also recommends 
returning areas with reduced contamination levels to occupational use.20 At the time, 
discussions were considering the potential for redeveloping portions of the Exclusion 
Zone in Ukraine, though it may be most suitable for industrial use such as supporting the 
construction efforts for the new reactor cover.21 
Shortly before the Chernobyl Forum published its final report, a team led by Jim 
T. Smith and Nicholas A. Beresford, ecologists from the United Kingdom edited a book 
assessing the long term impacts of Chernobyl. The book’ primary contribution is detailed 
explanations of the far-reaching environmental damages, protections and remediation 
applied, as well as prospects for recovery. Smith and Beresford summarize a wide range 
of research related to the radioactive depositions and subsequent effects on wildlife and 
                                                 
18 Kinley, Chernobyl’s Legacy, 35–6; United Nations Development Programme, The Human 
Consequences of the Chernobyl.  
19 Kinley, Chernobyl’s Legacy, 33–38.   
20 Ibid., 42–3.  
21 Ibid., 31.  
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the terrestrial and aquatic systems of rural Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. They describe 
the various types and effectiveness of countermeasures applied to reduce the spread of 
contamination and reduce internal uptake through the food chain. Other direct human 
ramifications fill two chapters detailing the health consequences and the long term social 
and economic effects.22  
One issue that remains controversial after Chernobyl is whether the full regime of 
permanent relocations undertaken was necessary. An official at the Russian Ministry of 
Public Health’s Institute of Biophysics argues that many of the long term radiation 
protection measures were excessive and unnecessary, resulting in increased detrimental 
economic and social impacts. Discussing the decision to relocate hundreds of thousands 
of people in the journal Health Physics in 1996, I.V. Filyushkin states, “this measure was 
obviously groundless, both medically and socially.” He points to the decision making in 
the political aftermath of Chernobyl as it coincided with the breakup of the Soviet Union 
which he believes was more influenced by emotionally charged rhetoric and politics than 
science.23 The Chernobyl Forum alludes to this controversy as well, noting that the 
benefits of the majority of relocations are unclear because they occurred years after the 
incident.24 
C. COMPARING FUKUSHIMA TO CHERNOBYL 
The Fukushima accident is frequently compared to the Chernobyl disaster in the 
media and a number of scholarly articles compare the radiological contamination levels 
and potential health impacts between the two incidents. However, few if any scholarly 
articles yet compare the lessons of Chernobyl to Japanese efforts to manage relocation 
and recovery of communities. NCRP Report No. 175 catalogues the broad impacts and 
countermeasures for all the major international nuclear/radiological incidents in its 
appendices, including Chernobyl and Fukushima. 
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One recent report includes both disasters in its examination of the implications of 
mass population displacement for improvised nuclear device planning in the U.S. In 
2013, Monica Schoch-Spana and colleagues from the Center for Biosecurity at the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) completed a comparative case study of 
eight disasters, including Fukushima and Chernobyl. Though it is not a direct comparison 
between the two nuclear disasters, the report synthesizes lessons from all eight disasters 
to derive a list of general recommendations for planning for population displacement.25  
Ann Norwood, an MD, contributed the Chernobyl chapter to the UPMC report. 
She describes how authorities lost credibility early on and never regained it due to 
delayed announcements of the accident and downplaying the magnitude of the risk, a 
pattern repeated to a lesser extent in Japan. After Chernobyl, rural villagers were moved 
to city apartments and a number chose to sneak back to their contaminated homes rather 
than stay. Later surveys demonstrate that towns that were relocated together suffered less 
mental stress overall. Another concern she notes is that the types and relative liberality of 
assistance provided to evacuees spurred envy among new neighbors and validated 
residents’ health fears. She also discusses the later success of the European ETHOS and 
CORE programs, which established community-based, self-managed, protective 
measures to reduce exposure and consumption of contaminated food and drink for those 
still living in areas with low dose contamination.26 
Ryan Morhard’s chapter describing the impact of the Fukushima disaster focuses 
primarily on the hardships faced by families and individuals living in evacuation centers 
for extended periods. He notes the discomforts and difficulties finding suitable work for 
rural villagers moving to urban locations, an issue that had arisen after Chernobyl. He 
describes the TEPCO and governmental compensation to evacuees and some of the 
negative side effects. He recommends careful balancing of the actual health risk versus 
the disruptive impacts of relocations.27 
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Schoch-Spana’s overall recommendations based on the eight case studies of 
displacement in the report include: avoid relocation when possible; rebuild livelihoods; 
prepare for supporting vulnerable populations; respect self-determination; preserve 
family and community ties; fight stigmatization; bolster mental health; and support host 
communities.28 
Thus, far, the literature relating to the 2011 Japan disaster recovery is more 
focused on the larger earthquake/tsunami disaster, with limited references to management 
of the radiological disaster specifically. The articles that do focus on the radiological 
impacts tend to focus on technical data about radiation depositions and/or health 
monitoring. Few assess the disaster management decision making based on that data, 
particularly as relates to decisions beyond year one. The most comprehensive coverage in 
the scholarly literature of the management of the radiation aspects of the disaster appear 
to relate to health implications and risk communication.  
D. RISK COMMUNICATION 
One of the most prevalent themes across the Chernobyl and other radiological 
disaster management literature is communication with the public and other stakeholders. 
In order to help the public make informed decisions quickly, it is critical for the 
government agencies to work out differences and provide unified, or at least consistent, 
public messaging. For the intermediate and late phase, the public will seek 
straightforward avenues to provide input into the restoration decisions that will have vital 
impacts on their livelihood. Amidst all this, public officials routinely face the challenge 
of outside experts providing contradictory information and advice.  
The commonly accepted definition of risk communication, as provided by the 
National Academies of Science (NAS), is  
an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among 
individuals, groups, and institutions. It involves multiple messages about 
the nature of risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, that express 
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concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages or to legal and 
institutional arrangements for risk management.29  
The NAS definition was a deliberate departure from widespread understanding at the 
time (1989) because the committee had identified a need to emphasize the multi-
directional nature of communications between the public and risk managers in 
government and industry.  
1. Public Trust 
Regarding risk communication as an interactive process with the public, in other 
words a stakeholder engagement, is an important factor in establishing and maintaining 
trust between members of the public and government and industry officials. Dr. Paul 
Slovic, of the University of Oregon Department of Psychology, summarized in Risk 
Analysis in the early 1990s a spate of recent studies showing that a growing dearth of 
trust was a primary factor in controversial political disputes about environmental and 
technological regulation.30 For the nuclear industry, this is not surprising in the wake of 
the Three Mile Island meltdown in 1979 and the Chernobyl explosion in 1986. Though 
Slovic’s article seems somewhat sympathetic to the nuclear industry, it is often cited in 
the risk management literature relating to public trust. He describes research showing that 
we tend to casually accept certain technological risks, such as medical procedures 
involving radiation, but have less confidence in industrial hazards such as chemical and 
nuclear plants. This can be related to polling that ranks the industries and their 
government regulators consistently low on trustworthiness.31 
It is probably not surprising to anyone that from a psychological standpoint trust 
is more difficult to gain than it is to lose. Also, the trust relationship is very susceptible to 
breakage by a negative event. Once broken, regaining the trust relationship is extremely 
difficult and sometimes irretrievable. Slovic describes research confirming and 
elaborating on the factors that underlie the phenomenon. Negative incidents that damage 
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trust are more noticeable and carry more weight than positive actions and events. People 
tend to give more credibility and the news media more air time to a negative source of 
information than positive ones. This was shown in a study where two stories, one positive 
and one negative on a similar risk, were published in an academic journal at the same 
time. The negative story got more media attention. One reason distrust is difficult to 
reverse is that we are likely to avoid constructive interaction with people and 
organizations we do not trust, thereby limiting any possibility to change our 
perceptions.32  
The factors that make one group seem more trustworthy to us depend on what 
type of group we are according to survey conducted by Peters, Covello, and McCallum in 
1997. They find that for industry, actions demonstrating caring and compassion will 
improve our perceptions of a company’s credibility, perhaps because we expect the 
opposite. For government agencies, commitment is the most important factor for the 
public to trust spokespersons and the agency they represent. The team also asked what 
makes citizen advocacy groups trustworthy. For these groups it is important they exhibit 
knowledge and expertise.33 
Dr. Steven M. Becker, of the College of Health Sciences at Old Dominion 
University, has written several articles evaluating practical applications of the trust 
research underpinning the risk communication discipline. He describes key results from 
the Center for Disease Control (CDC) funded “Pre-Event Message Development 
Project,” for which he served as principal investigator. One finding that has important 
implications for disaster response and recovery is that the public trusts television 
meteorologists as messengers during disasters.34 Television meteorologists may not be 
radiation experts but they could be helpful in referring the public to trusted sources of 
radiation safety information. Becker also points out that health is a primary concern 
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people have about radiation hazards and suggests further investment in developing 
medical professionals and health agencies as trusted sources of information in post-
disaster settings.35 This corresponds with Slovic’s earlier point that the public is more 
trusting of radiation management by the medical profession than government officials 
and industry representatives. 
2. Individual Perception of Risk 
At a basic level, one element of risk communication is about infusing factual, 
scientific information into the public’s natural rational thinking process to quickly assess 
and react to danger in the environment. In a more recent, post-9/11 article, a team led by 
Slovic explores the nature of humans’ automatic, nearly subconscious, “experiential 
system” as it relates to fear and decision making. They describe how the experiential 
system is both naturally well suited to help us make risk decisions and at other times fails 
us. The system seems to work well to protect us from imminent dangers in our immediate 
environment. When judging risks of future loss or danger, we are more likely to give 
higher value to emotional attachments within our current surroundings. So, for example, 
people will pay more to insure an item that has sentimental value.36  
The experiential system can fail when savvy advertisers or malevolent dictators 
manipulate it by playing on our natural impulses. Our systems are also naturally pre-
dispositioned to pay more attention to our body’s basic needs such as hunger, warmth, or 
addiction than to future risks. Research has also shown that the system is calibrated to 
give more weight to small threat indicators in our near environment compared to large 
numbers that are harder to fathom, particularly if remote to us.37  
The Slovic team suggests risk managers pay attention to a few key factors: first 
that the job of analytical and scientific risk information is to assist people to balance their 
reactive emotions in decision making; careful incorporation of affect into the presentation 
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of analytical information can improve how it is perceived; and risk managers must take 
into account the value of people’s emotions and concerns, including how feelings of 
dread and lack of control impact them.38 The second point on this list warrants a note of 
caution about professional responsibility. Risk managers must recognize they are in effect 
always influencing public perceptions and consider the potential consequences of their 
communication efforts, both intended and unintended. 
Dr. Elaine Peters led a team that describes one method humans have to evaluate 
risk in the context of radiological hazards as “stigma susceptibility.” They find that our 
judgments are influenced not just by stimuli in our environment such as nearby and world 
events, but also by negative emotions (such as fear and anger) derived from our past 
experiences. Thus, cultural and geographic differences will affect our reaction to 
potential dangers. Peters’ team notes that previous research characterized stigma as a 
moral response and their findings that it can be tied to emotion suggest different 
mitigation strategies. One option they suggest, education programs, would have fewer 
potential ethical implications since it would not be a direct manipulation of a person’s 
emotional response.39 
3. Risk Communication in Disaster Management Practice  
Becker discusses the importance and progress of the field of risk communication 
relating research to practical application for radiological/nuclear terrorism. He defines 
four phases of advancement and asserts that the U.S. is currently in phase three, 
“development of improved messages and materials” and transitioning to phase four, 
“moving beyond better messages and materials.” He notes that development of 
messaging for the recovery phase is a necessary area of further attention. Though Becker 
does not make the distinction, it may be fair to infer that recovery phase risk 
communication is still hovering between phase one “awareness of the importance of 
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communication” and phase two “research initiatives to understand public needs and 
preferences.”40  
Dr. Vincent Covello, founder and Director of the Center for Risk Communication, 
is known for helping organizations to apply risk communication research to practical 
application, including for disaster management planning. His 2011 Health Physics article 
reads like a bible for risk communicators dealing with radiological emergency planning. 
It includes basic rules and standard models for effective risk communication in general. 
The article outlines the primary challenges to effective risk communication and 
recommends strategies to address them. Over half the article is devoted to practical 
appendices of strategies and tools specific to radiological emergencies that include 
message templates and anticipated media and public questions. The questions are 
organized by topics such as potential health impacts, sheltering in place, evacuation, 
decontamination of persons, radiation monitoring and data, radiological cleanup, 
economic impacts, environmental and agricultural impacts, etc. Much of the guidance 
included in this article is incorporated into NCRP Report No. 175, Appendix E.41 This 
list covers some of the late phase recovery issues (e.g., What is being done to combat 
stigmatization of the community? Can residents get jobs helping with cleanup?) that are 
rarely found in governmental public information guidance.42 
As the NAS definition makes clear and the NCRP Report No. 175 emphasizes, 
risk communication is not just about sharing information with the public in a transparent 
way, but also involving stakeholders in decision making. The IRPA’s 2009 publication of 
Guiding Principles for Radiation Protection Professionals on Stakeholder Engagement 
provides a commonly accepted foundation. The Health Physics Society endorsed the 
Guiding Principles in 2010 and NCRP Report No. 175 refers to them throughout and 
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particularly in Section 5.6 Making Decisions.43 The IRPA document emphasizes the need 
for systematic efforts to involve interested parties in decisions and the recognition that 
not all participants begin with shared understanding of the language and concepts of 
radiation protection and risk. The ten principles (listed below) may apply to pre-incident 
decisions such as siting a nuclear power plant or waste storage locations or post-incident 
decisions about planning for remediation and reoccupancy.44  
1. Identify opportunities for engagement and ensure the level of engagement 
is proportionate to the nature of the radiation protection issues and their 
context. 
2. Initiate the process as early as possible, and develop a sustainable 
implementation plan. 
3. Enable an open, inclusive and transparent stakeholder engagement 
process. 
4. Seek out and involve relevant stakeholders and experts.  
5. Ensure that the roles and responsibilities of all participants, and the rules 
for cooperation are clearly defined. 
6. Collectively develop objectives for the stakeholder engagement process, 
based on a shared understanding of issues and boundaries.  
7. Develop a culture which values a shared language and understanding, and 
favours collective learning.  
8. Respect and value the expression of different perspectives.  
9. Ensure a regular feedback mechanism is in place to inform and improve 
current and future stakeholder engagement processes.  
10. Apply the IRPA Code of Ethics in their actions within these processes to 
the best of their knowledge. 
Experiences after the 2010 Gulf Coast oil spill offer another perspective in 
applying risk communications concepts in practice after a disaster. With support from the 
National Science Foundation, George Washington University sociologist Sabrina 
McCormick assesses the emerging impact of crowd sourced data as a form of citizen 
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science on risk assessment and disaster recovery policy. She outlines the interplay 
between official governmental and “responsible party” risk assessment reports, those 
provided by independent experts, and data gathered by laypersons, specifically crowd 
sourced collections. McCormick promotes the idea that crowd sourcing is shifting the 
established model of citizen science and potentially lends new legitimacy to the efforts of 
environmental and social groups to influence policy.45  
Crowd sourced data issues have already begun to play out in Japan. Volunteers in 
Japan and around the world have begun building a radiation detection sensor network 
using off the shelf and custom built or modified Geiger counters. The Safecast network’s 
objectives are primarily to put more information into the hands of Japanese residents and 
to ensure a detailed record of radiation levels is created showing how the radiation levels 
change over time for future research purposes.46 The rise of the Internet has completely 
changed the playing field for risk communication, making the public less dependent on 
“official” information sources. Planners and policymakers now must factor the pervasive 
use of widespread radiation detection and crowd sourced posting and mapping of 
measurements into public information planning for radiological emergencies.  
E. SUMMARY AND NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The literature associated with managing the intermediate and late phase recovery 
of a radiological disaster has much to benefit from the ongoing experience of managers in 
Japan. The bulk of the scholarly literature is based on lessons from managing the impacts 
of Chernobyl. Technical findings about the effectiveness of protective action 
countermeasures or remediation techniques continue to be transferable and will advance 
from new technologies and innovations being tested in Japan. The unique political 
situation of the Soviet Union at the time of the Chernobyl disaster makes it difficult to 
evaluate and relate observations about many of the overarching disaster recovery 
management decisions and practices. The context of the population relocations in Japan 
is much more similar to what U.S. managers would face after a radiological disaster—an 
                                                 
45 Sabrina McCormick, “After the Cap: Risk Assessment, Citizen Science and Disaster Recovery,” 
Ecology & Society 17, no. 4 (2012). http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss4/art31/  
46 Safecast, “About Safecast,” accessed January 6, 2014, http://blog.safecast.org/about/   
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active, questioning media; citizens armed with high expectations and easily accessible 
and conflicting information; a land use system based on private property rights; and a 
stable national government in place to coordinate recovery support. 
With few exceptions, the majority of articles and books related to radiological 
disaster management focus narrowly on either the immediate response or the technical or 
health implications of the recovery. Few tackle the broader and intricate issues of 
supporting relocated populations and businesses while juggling remediation, hazardous 
waste management, and infrastructure restoration. The Fukushima disaster is still in its 
infancy; as is the literature developing out of the experience. Additional research 
reviewing the decision making and outcomes related to managing the relocations and 
resettlements in areas affected by radiological contamination will be beneficial to ensure 















This thesis is designed to answer the primary research question, “what lessons can 
the U.S. incorporate into its disaster management plans from Japan’s experience 
managing the relocation of communities due to the contamination from the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear plant?” This study applies a basic comparative analytical approach, with 
the objective of identifying practical lessons that can be applied in the U.S. for planning 
for future disaster recovery management. The case reviews events, decisions, and 
outcomes after the Fukushima disaster and identifies key practices and potential lessons 
that may be useful for U.S. nuclear disaster recovery planners.  
To derive and assess potential lessons, the author collected and reviewed over 400 
source documents available from the Japanese central government, Fukushima 
Prefecture, the affected municipalities, TEPCO, nongovernmental organizations, and the 
media. In addition, the author reviewed scholarly articles and books published regarding 
the 2011 disaster. The recommendations are based on a comparative analysis of lessons 
derived from the case for applicability to disaster management policies, plans, and 
experience in the United States. 
A. UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
This is a single social science case study to evaluate and derive lessons from the 
national and regional/local level governmental decision making regarding management of 
the relocation and resettlement of communities due to widespread radiological 
contamination. The case selected is the disaster recovery after the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident of 2011. The unit of analysis is individual decisions and key practices made by 
governmental organizations at all levels responsible for disaster management. The study 
reviews management practices of the Japanese municipalities assisting residents and 
businesses, as well as those of the Fukushima Prefectural government and the Japanese 
central government, primarily the executive and legislative branches. 
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B. CASE SELECTION 
During the design phase of this research, the researcher considered a multi-case 
study design to provide a more full comparison between the Chernobyl case and the 
Fukushima case. Ultimately, based on the literature review, the researcher adopted the 
single case design. The primary criterion for selecting the Fukushima case is that it is a 
recent, unique disaster incident that involves extended displacement of communities due 
to radiological contamination. Before Fukushima, the most significant international 
nuclear power plant incident was the 1986 explosions at Chernobyl, Ukraine (Soviet 
Union). The most significant U.S. incident was the partial core meltdown at Three Mile 
Island, Pennsylvania in 1979. 
The Chernobyl explosions resulted in widespread, significant radioactive releases, 
the abandonment of a number of surrounding villages, and relocation of over 350,000 
people.47 The communist regime of the Soviet Union managed the accident aftermath, 
with very different standards for transparency and inclusiveness from the U.S. Since 
1986, technologies for monitoring and managing contamination and tools for 
communication between disaster managers and with the public have transformed 
dramatically. This means that some recovery management practices from the Chernobyl 
incident are simply no longer relevant compared to the Japan case. The primary utility of 
the Chernobyl example is the time that has elapsed since the accident, which allows for 
examination of the enduring impacts of recovery policy decisions.  
The Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in 1979 caused the Governor 
to recommend people within a ten mile radius stay indoors and to order the evacuation of 
children and pregnant women within a five mile radius for a brief 10 days. Many more 
people voluntarily evacuated during the emergency period. A very small amount of 
radiation was released beyond the plant site.48 Despite the minimal radioactive release, 
the accident resulted in $1.3 million in American Nuclear Insurers’ payouts to evacuees 
and over $81 million in estimated economic losses to businesses within a 20 mile 
                                                 
47 United Nations Development Programme, The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl, 32.   
48 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” 
accessed September 12, 2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html  
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radius.49 Recovery phase lessons from Three Mile Island are of limited value for this 
inquiry because of the lack of offsite impacts and the communications and other 
technology changes since 1979. 
Despite significant cultural differences with the U.S., Japan is a modern, 
developed country, with high-tech buildings and infrastructure, and some of the most 
advanced disaster resistant technologies and building codes in the world.50 Japan has a 
western-style, democratic, parliamentary system of government with a prime minister and 
a Diet with two houses, which have been controlled by different parties since 2007.51 
Japan does lack a comprehensive disaster management law and central agency with 
corresponding responsibility such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency.52 
Still, disaster management lessons from Japan will be more transferable than nearly any 
other large international calamity over the last decade because of these important 
similarities to the U.S. Additionally, being a recent event, the technological tools and 
forms of public media employed during recovery management are contemporary for 
planning purposes. 
The Japanese government had the benefit of information and outcomes from the 
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island experiences, and Japanese policies and actions would 
have attempted to incorporate many of these lessons. As such, Chapter II, Literature 
Review, summarizes the rich body of literature from the Chernobyl accident as a 
reference point for this analysis.  
                                                 
49 Peter S. Houts, Paul D. Cleary, and Teh-Wei Hu, Three Mile Island Crisis: Psychological, Social, 
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50 K. Crowley, and John R. Elliott, “Earthquake Disasters and Resilience in the Global North: Lessons 
from New Zealand and Japan,” The Geographical Journal 178, no. 3 (2012): 208.  
51 Jeff Kingston, ed., Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response and Recovery after 
Japan’s 3/11 ( New York: Routledge, 2012), 189.  
52 Alex Greer, “Earthquake Preparedness and Response: Comparison of the United States and Japan,” 
Leadership and Management in Engineering 12, no. 3 (2012): 111–125.   
28 
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study is specifically focused on decision making related to management of 
the relocation and resettlement of communities (residents, businesses, municipal services) 
due to the radiological contamination. Some of the major recovery management factors 
include: public messaging regarding potential health impacts, relocation logistics, and 
available assistance; preparing host communities to receive and support temporarily 
displaced residents; assisting residents to maintain or re-establish livelihoods; ensuring 
physical and mental health of residents; ensuring continuity of critical infrastructure and 
other key community services; and orchestrating decontamination and waste disposal 
work.  
Each of these factors alone is complex and multi-layered. This thesis necessarily 
touches lightly on some factors due in part to scope limitations, but also in order to retain 
attention on the research questions. For example, psycho-social support and infrastructure 
restoration are both significant capabilities for recovery management and are essential to 
the re-establishment of communities displaced by disaster. Given resource and 
information availability limitations, this study includes references to psycho-social 
support and infrastructure restoration efforts in the larger context without examining 
them individually in-depth. 
The study does not focus on the causes of the disasters themselves or other 
immediate response efforts other than evacuation. Similarly, the disaster management 
efforts that relate solely to the earthquake and tsunami impacts in Japan are beyond the 
scope of this effort. The case description will provide brief summary accounts to provide 
context. To the extent that management and decisions relate to the overall disaster 
including the radiological impacts, they may be included. 
A wealth of information and official documents related to this disaster are 
available and easily accessible in English. In some cases, documents or websites of 
interest are not yet available with official English translations. The study utilized 
informal translations when necessary to identify source existence and locations. For 
example, some municipalities offer English versions of their websites and some 
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documents and plans related to the recovery are posted in English translation versions. If 
a municipality’s website is only available in Japanese, the researcher may have used 
informal translations to determine that a revitalization plan was posted and the date in 
order to establish a more complete chronology. The plan content is only used as a 
primary source when an official translation is available. The major findings of the study 
are based on official translations (frequently labeled provisional) and original English 
source materials. 
D. DATA SOURCES 
To compile the case, the author collected and reviewed over 400 source 
documents in four categories: 1) government reports, plans, press releases, survey results, 
website postings, etc.; 2) Japanese and international media reports about the incident, 
impacts, and ongoing recovery; 3) publications of interested organizations (international 
advisory bodies, advocacy groups, professional associations, etc.) about the disaster; and 
4) scholarly literature about the event and aftermath. 
Based on the best practices outlined by Robert K. Yin in Case Study Research, 
Design and Methods, this research examines decisions and practices from more than one 
perspective to the extent possible using documents from different sources for 
triangulation and comparison.53 For example, if the central government published a plan, 
the plan itself as well as media accounts and third party critiques regarding the plan are 
included and evaluated against the case study questions.  
E. TYPE AND MODE OF ANALYSIS 
This research followed a case study protocol designed to explore the selected 
research questions. The protocol includes the following steps: 
1. Develop a case study database to organize the source documents and notes 
from document review relative to the research questions.  
2. Collect, categorize by event date and keyword, and organize in the 
database, documents from the sources described in section III.D. The 
                                                 
53 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, vol. 5, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2003), 97.  
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assigned keywords relate each document to the following policy 
themes/management capabilities: 
a. evacuation and sheltering 
b. public information/risk communication 
c. recovery planning and stakeholder involvement 
d. temporary housing 
e. decontamination 
f. resettlement 
3. Review documents to identify the chain of events, decisions/key practices, 
influencing variables, and potential outcomes.  
4. Compare decisions/key practices and outcomes to assess how well the 
identified lessons might apply in the U.S. disaster management context.  
5. Report findings. 
F. OUTPUT 
The results of this research and analysis are summarized in Chapters IV–VI. 
Chapter IV, Relocation and Recovery after the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, which 
describes the onset of the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown through the present day ongoing 
recovery and resettlement, serves as the focal point of the report. The structure of Chapter 
IV is a hybrid of chronological and thematic description. Each section in the case 
narrative explores a core recovery management capability or policy theme and examines 
the events, actions, decisions, key practices, and reactions related to that theme.  
To the extent possible, the sequence of the themed sections follows the general 
chronology of events and the descriptions within each section are organized to follow the 
chronology as well. Because activities occur simultaneously that influence multiple 
themes, the resulting narrative gives precedence to the themes over pure chronology 
when necessary. 
Chapter V summarizes in tables the evaluation of effectiveness of key practices 
and how applicable the lessons derived from the Fukushima experience would be in the 
U.S. policy environment. This analysis compares the decisions and events in Japan to the 
political/organizational, geographical, and cultural environment in the U.S.  
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The study concludes with a set of planning recommendations for U.S. 
nuclear/radiological disaster recovery managers based on the analysis results. Chapter VI 
also highlights five potential topics for future research that would benefit U.S. 
radiological disaster recovery planning efforts. Leaders and planners will be able to apply 
the recommendations in the final chapter to enhance efforts to prepare for the 
intermediate and late phase recovery from radiological disasters. 
32 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
33 
IV. RELOCATION AND RECOVERY AFTER THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENT  
Wrecked fishing boats still lie stranded miles inland and there are vast 
piles of scrap metal, smashed cars, bits of concrete bridges and broken 
wooden house frames where once a thriving village stood. An abandoned 
elementary school, 500m from the sea, looks as though it has been 
bombed. 
—Simon Tisdall, Guardian, describes Namie, Japan in January 201454 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The core of this case study is to fully understand the decision making related to 
management of the relocation and resettlement of communities due to the radiological 
contamination in Fukushima. This account includes a brief summary of the disaster 
management context in Japan as well as an overall disaster event description.  
It is important when examining the decision making of officials in Japan to 
remember they are managing the impacts of three nearly simultaneous disasters, any one 
of which would challenge the most seasoned professionals. Nonetheless, in order to focus 
the case description on the underlying research questions of this study, the narrative 
includes only minimal references to the disaster management efforts that relate solely to 
the earthquake and tsunami impacts. To the extent that management and decisions relate 
to the overall disaster including the radiological impacts, they are included. Likewise, the 
narrative incorporates only limited references to the causes of the nuclear meltdown itself 
or other immediate response efforts. The case description focuses on the concerns and 
recovery management efforts related to the sudden, forced relocation of people and 
communities, beginning with the evacuation.  
Chapter IV is divided up by thematic sections in order to explore the issues and 
key recovery support practices relevant to the research questions. This case does not 
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attempt an exhaustive accounting of the innumerable impacts, issues, and decisions 
involved in managing recovery after a nuclear disaster. The timeline of events related to 
each theme are grouped together in the relevant section.  
B. JAPAN’S DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
It is hard to imagine there is a more disaster-prone nation in the world. Between 
the years 2004–2014, 302 earthquakes of a magnitude 6.0 or higher struck Japan. Despite 
its relatively small size, the 302 comprised 18.5 percent of all such earthquakes 
worldwide. Japan also has seven percent of the world’s active volcanoes and is subject to 
typhoons, flooding, heavy snow, and landslides.55 
The overarching law that governs national disaster related authorities, systems, 
and plans in Japan is the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. Under the Act, a Central 
Disaster Management Council is responsible for advising the prime minister and ensuring 
a national Basic Disaster Management Plan is in place that encompasses the full 
preparedness cycle. The Plan was overhauled after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 
of 1995 and includes a substantial section on recovery and rehabilitation. Each prefecture 
and municipality also must have a disaster management council and local disaster 
management plan.56 
Under the national Plan, a team of the directors general from each ministry gather 
in the Crisis Management Center within the prime minister’s office during an incident to 
coordinate and advise the prime minister. If necessary, the government may establish a 
Headquarters for Disaster Management, which would be led by the Minister of State for 
Disaster Management, or in extreme events, the prime minister.57 After a 1978 
earthquake and again after the 1995 earthquake which killed 6,400 people, Japan has 
continually strengthened its policy framework to invest in codes and structural hazard 
                                                 
55 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Disaster Management in Japan,” 2014, 
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56 Ibid., 8–9.  
57 Ibid., 10.  
35 
mitigation of buildings and infrastructure to reduce loss of life and damages from 
earthquakes.58 
Japan’s disaster management system includes a comprehensive program of 
“Recovery and Rehabilitation Measures” in the form of subsidies, loans, insurance, tax 
breaks, or direct payments by the central government to support rebuilding of public 
facilities and infrastructure, agriculture, small businesses, and livelihoods. Another 
enhancement enacted after the 1995 earthquake is the Act on Support for Livelihood 
Recovery of Disaster Victims passed in 1998. The act provides for payments of up to 
three million yen (approximately $25,074) after certain larger disasters to households 
when the home is destroyed.59 However, Japanese policy generally provides little support 
for individuals to reconstruct their own homes.60  
1. Nuclear Power Regulation and Emergency Preparedness 
The primary governing authorities for regulation of nuclear power and emergency 
preparedness prior to the 2011 disaster are the Atomic Energy Basic Act, the Reactor 
Regulation Act, the Electricity Business Act, the Act on Special Measures for Nuclear 
Disasters. The Atomic Energy Basic Act, enacted in 1955 established the foundational 
philosophy that nuclear energy development in Japan would be for peaceful purposes and 
conducted safely.61 
Under the Electricity Business Act and the Reactor Regulation Act, the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) licensed nuclear reactor operations and its 
subcomponent, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, conducted safety inspections. 
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The Radiation Review Council within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology (MEXT) was responsible for oversight of dose limits for radiation 
workers. MEXT also had responsibility for assisting the prefectures and municipalities 
with radiation monitoring and measurement.62 
The Nuclear Safety Commission, an independent organization under the Cabinet 
Office, established guidelines to implement the legislative authorities governing the 
operation of nuclear plants. The commission was also responsible for auditing the safety 
regulation activities of METI and MEXT, as well as advising the prime minister during 
emergencies.63  
In 1999, Japan had amended the Act on Special Measures for Nuclear Disasters 
after a criticality accident at a small nuclear fuel preparation plant in Tokaimura. The 
criticality incident killed two operators and resulted in a one day evacuation of 161 
people and indoor precautionary sheltering of 310,000 in the surrounding area.64 The 
new law established provisions for emergency response actions, a declaration of nuclear 
emergency, convening of a Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, and restoration 
measures.65 
The Fukushima meltdown caused a new review of the nuclear power regulatory 
structure in 2011 and 2012. The Nuclear Regulation Authority Establishment Act of June 
2012 established a more fully independent Nuclear Regulation Authority that replaced 
the Nuclear Safety Commission in September of that year.66 
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2. Concept of Operations for Nuclear Emergencies 
The Nuclear Emergency Response Manual was designed to provide a unified 
concept of response for all the involved authorities and players during radiological 
emergencies. The operator of a nuclear plant is responsible for managing the incident on-
site at the plant and reporting it as soon as possible to METI’s Emergency Response 
Center, which would then notify the Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office would then 
establish a Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters in Tokyo and an off-site Local 
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters near the accident. Senior officials from each 
ministry deploy to assist with resource and information coordination at the Crisis 
Management Center within the Cabinet Office, while cabinet ministers would gather with 
the prime minister.67 METI would be responsible for advising the prime minister when 
pre-determined safety levels warrant designation of a nuclear emergency.68 Figure 1 
depicts the planned nuclear response organizational structure. 
                                                 
67 Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, Interim Report 
(Tokyo, Japan: 2011), http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/, 5.  
68 Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA, II-9.  
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Figure 1.  Outline of nuclear emergency response related organizations69 
C. OVERVIEW OF INCIDENT, IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AND 
EVACUATIONS 
Though triggered by a massive earthquake and tsunami, forces of nature all too 
familiar to the island nation of Japan, the National Diet’s Nuclear Accident Investigation 
Commission declared the Fukushima meltdown a “manmade” catastrophe. The Diet 
Commission’s judgment referred to the inadequate protection of the plant and backup 
power systems against known hazards as well as poor preparedness of employees, 
managers, regulators, national and local officials, and the public to respond to such an 
emergency. 
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1. Cascading Catastrophe 
The Great East Japan Earthquake struck at 2:46 pm on March 11, 2011 and 
registered a 9.0 magnitude on the Richter scale, the largest ever observed in Japan’s 
history.70 Fukushima Daiichi units 1, 2, and 3 went into emergency shut down 
immediately with the onset of seismic tremors. Units 4, 5, and 6 were already offline for 
routine inspection. Seismic damage also resulted in a total loss of off-site power to the 
plant.  
When the 14–15 meter tsunami waves hit the plant approximately 45 minutes 
later, all but one (at unit 6) of the 12 backup diesel generators were destroyed. The worst 
case scenario for nuclear plant safety, a “station blackout” had occurred. Critical 
emergency cooling systems activated after the earthquake were now lost. The inundation 
and debris, loss of instrumentation and light, as well as continuing aftershocks severely 
hampered emergency response efforts by TEPCO employees.71 Despite efforts to inject 
freshwater and vent the units, the loss of cooling caused spent fuel rod exposures at 
reactor 4 and catastrophic core meltdowns in reactors 1 thru 3. Overheating of the core 
required pressure relief that released radioactive elements as well as gaseous hydrogen 
into the secondary containment building. The first of three hydrogen explosions occurred 
the following afternoon in Unit 1. When the hydrogen exploded, it started fires that 
created large plumes that carried radioactive elements downwind over a large area of the 
Prefecture. 
In its October, 2013 report on the accident, the United Nations Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) estimates the environmental 
releases of radioactive Iodine 131 to be 10 percent and Cesium 137 to be 50 percent 
compared to Chernobyl discharges.72 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 
that the effective radiation dose for the general population in the most affected areas of 
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Fukushima Prefecture outside the 20 km evacuation zone was between 10–50 mSv. The 
average annual background effective radiation dose worldwide is 2.4 mSv. The WHO 
report assesses that no appreciable increase of cancer risk will result in the general 
population from this level of exposure. The report attributes the low level of risk in part 
to the protective actions including evacuations and food safety measures taken by the 
central and local governments.73  
2. The Evacuation 
Evacuations did protect residents, but the evacuation process was improvised, 
chaotic, and extremely distressing for residents. Unlike the earthquake and tsunami 
hazards, very little planning and exercise had occurred to prepare local Japanese officials 
and residents for evacuation due to a radiation leak at the power plant, leading to an ad 
hoc, confused process fraught with poor communication.74 To better understand the 
evacuee’s experiences and prior understanding of risk, the Diet Commission conducted a 
postal survey of evacuated residents in March 2012. Over 50 percent (10,633 of 21,000) 
randomly selected households from twelve Fukushima municipalities replied. Fewer than 
15 percent of evacuees indicated they had participated in an evacuation drill or been 
informed of the possibility of a nuclear accident at the plant prior to the earthquake.75 
The Diet Commission also documents the fractured communications within and 
between the central, prefectural, and local levels of government. The commission report 
is particularly critical of the confusion and paralysis within the central government 
between the prime minister’s office, various cabinet ministers, the Nuclear and Industrial 
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Safety Agency, the Nuclear Safety Commission, the Emergency Operations Team within 
the Crisis Management Center at the prime minister’s office, and senior TEPCO officials. 
With little information coming from the central government, Fukushima Prefecture 
issued the first official evacuation order for a 2 km zone around the plant on the evening 
of March 11. Unfortunately unaware of Fukushima’s action, the central government 
issued an order 30 minutes later for a 3 km zone evacuation and shelter in place for 10 
km.76  
However, these conflicting messages apparently reached only a small portion of 
the at risk population. Despite the prime minister’s Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency 
Situation at 7:03 pm and multiple evacuation orders on March 11, a staggering 80 percent 
of Fukushima residents first learned of the accident at the plant on March 12 or later.77 In 
a single day (March 12), the central government increased the evacuation zone first from 
3 km to 10 km, then to 20 km with no details about the severity of the situation or 
anticipated duration.78 This caused many to bring few necessities, leave pets behind, and 
some to move multiple times as the zone expanded.79 
Communications failures resulted in some residents moving into areas with higher 
radiation concentrations. Radiation monitoring equipment near the plant was damaged in 
the tsunami, contributing to delays in accurate environmental readings. In the absence of 
official plume projections, several local officials ordered evacuations that moved 
residents into the path of higher levels of radiation. Ultimately, it took the government 
over a month to assemble and analyze the environmental radiation data in order to fully 
establish all evacuation zones.80 It was not until April that some residents who moved 
into areas of higher concentrations were then instructed to move again.81 
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The evacuation of elderly nursing home residents out of the 20 km zone around 
the nuclear plant was harrowing and disastrous in and of itself. Fifty patients were 
confirmed to have died during the hurried and muddled evacuation.82 Fukushima Medical 
University reports that mortalities for elderly evacuees increased overall 2.4 times the 
2010 rate for senior Fukushima residents, with even higher rates in the first 3 months. 
Contributing factors include poor planning for evacuation of institutions housing elderly 
residents, inadequate supplies of warm blankets and food to support evacuees, multiple 
moves over a short period, and refusals to accept elderly evacuees from radiation zones at 
relocation sites. Given the high mortality rates for elderly evacuees, a number of 
researchers have recommended that serious consideration be given to limiting or 
staggering evacuations of nursing homes during radiological disasters, depending on the 
situation.83 
While the planned evacuations in villages like Iitate were undertaken in an orderly 
manner over a month after the initial disaster, mixed messages and uncertainty of the 
situation during the intervening period may have been detrimental for residents. From 
March 15 to April 22, a shelter indoors order applied to the rest of the 20–30 km zone 
around the plant. Many residents confined themselves to more sedentary lifestyles during 
this time, potentially exacerbating chronic health conditions, especially for the elderly.84 
Ultimately, 154,000 Fukushima residents evacuated, 107,000 of whom were from 
the evacuation order areas. Most (97,000) found temporary housing elsewhere in the 
Prefecture, and 57,000 were living in other prefectures as of May, 2013.85 With whole 
towns empty, government officials have faced significant challenges just maintaining 
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security for large areas with multiple access points. Large numbers of security personnel 
are required who are trained and equipped to work in and near radioactive contamination 
sites. Towns formed neighborhood watch teams to patrol the deserted streets and ward off 
criminals.86 Once roads began reopening near restricted areas, looting at abandoned 
homes and businesses increased. Towns began installing security cameras as further 
deterrence.87 For evacuees, worrying about the security of the home or business they left 
behind adds to their stress and anxiety.88 
D. PUBLIC INFORMATION/RISK COMMUNICATION 
Many of the issues that arose during the evacuation process related to the 
management of public information by the central and local governments. Public 
information management is a critical aspect of disaster response and recovery. During the 
immediate crisis, public warnings are a matter of life and death. Effective evacuation 
relies on clear messaging to convey the urgency and specific parameters the government 
is establishing to guide the process, i.e., which areas are to be evacuated and when, where 
it is safe to go and shelters are open, what public transportation resources are available 
and how to access them, how long the evacuation is likely to last, what special measures 
people should take to protect themselves while in transit, etc. 
The importance of well managed public information does not diminish as the 
urgent threats recede, particularly after a radiation disaster. Coordinated messaging 
regarding available shelter and assistance and the status of their home community reduces 
confusion and anxiety for evacuees. Managing public information to assist residents and 
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communities as they navigate their way through a potentially protracted recovery process 
helps to knit all of the complex variables together cohesively.  
1. Public Information for Dispersed Residents 
For evacuees living in shelters or temporary housing during the early stages, 
access to official public information about services and recovery progress was often 
inadequate. For example, the shelters set up specifically to support persons with 
disabilities were not all pre-planned and therefore were not included in supply and 
information distribution systems that supported the general population shelters. Once 
residents moved out of shelters into temporary housing, their access to information and 
services dropped even more. The housing sites were located further from distribution 
sites, suitable transportation was often not available, and initially no systems were in 
place to track evacuees to ensure continuity of support by aid groups. Volunteer 
organizations struggled to find evacuees in need of support and were generally unable to 
get information from local communities due to privacy concerns.89 
As the situation stabilized, both the central and local (prefectural and municipal) 
governments leveraged their websites as a key tool for sharing recovery information. 
Japan’s Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and the Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology established linking websites early 
after the event. They post information for residents, including maps of the most recent 
restricted zones and roadmaps describing strategies and systems in place to assist 
residents, conduct decontamination work, and secure the plant itself.90  
Since 2012, Fukushima Prefecture includes videos on its website under the 
heading, “Future from Fukushima Broadcasting Channel,” in addition to it disaster 
recovery information pages. The channel includes tourism promotion and explanations of 
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the cares growers and manufactures are taking to ensure food, bottled water, and sake are 
safe for consumption.91 
The mayor of Kawauchi had an active blog prior to the disaster that he restarted in 
mid-April 2011 to share disaster relief information. The mayor has continued to blog on 
at least a weekly basis to communicate with displaced residents and discuss efforts to 
prepare Kawauchi for repopulation.92 The town of Okuma, one of two communities that 
host the plant, notes in its official major event timeline that it launched its disaster 
information website on March 24. Recognizing that varied means of communication are 
necessary to reach all populations, Okuma also began disseminating a bi-weekly 
newsletter in June. 
2. Public Trust 
Professionals agree that early missteps by the government and TEPCO officials 
during the initial crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant severely eroded trust in official 
public information; a condition that has unfortunately endured throughout the recovery. 
Experts attribute the loss of trust primarily to official lack of transparency. Driven by an 
apprehension of inciting fear and panic, officials downplayed the severity of the accident 
and refused to speculate openly about potential problems and impacts.93 Lacking 
coordinated plans and prepared messages for a plant meltdown scenario, officials 
struggled to communicate effectively with residents. Delays of official information may 
have allowed misinformation to fill the void and certainly added to residents’ anxiety.94 
The ruling party has made numerous efforts at public contrition for the failures in 
communication and transparency. The cabinet’s own investigation committee devoted 
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significant space in its report to document the instances of delayed and deliberate 
misinformation that occurred during the early crisis phase.95 However, the principle 
described by risk communication expert Slovic has held true for Japan. It takes many 
times longer and far more effort to rebuild public trust once it is lost.96 
The efforts government officials are taking to regain trust are full of potential 
pitfalls and may appear to observers as one step forward, two steps back. Some local 
leaders earned praise for taking extra measures to keep their communities together by 
setting up offices inside shelters and maintaining communications with residents.97 Over 
time, however, perceptions have grown that some local leaders have pushed the 
community cohesion case too far in pressing for residents to return to areas with lifted 
evacuation orders. This has led to some individuals and families feeling disenfranchised 
because they remain concerned about contamination levels despite official assurances.98  
For residents of the restricted areas, their patience wears thin at promises they will 
be able to move home eventually. They wonder if leaders have known all along the 
cleanup will take much longer than predicted and are suppressing the information in 
order to gain acceptance for restarting other nuclear plants idled after the accident.99 
Residents also suspect preparations for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics are taking precedence 
and funneling resources and attention away from the cleanup and restoration in 
Fukushima. Fukushima evacuees remain concerned that the rest of the country is not fully 
supporting the recovery and average Japanese people are losing awareness of their 
plight.100  
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Even discussing the potential for abandoning any of the restricted areas has been 
considered a taboo among Japanese officials at all levels of government. An LDP (ruling 
party) official incited angry reactions from various local village officials, including those 
from Futuba and Iitate, when he stated during a speech in Sapporo in November 2013, 
“The time will come when someone must say, ‘You cannot live here anymore, but we 
will make up for it.’”101 At least one local official, Koichi Miyamoto, mayor of Tomioka 
appreciated the candor, noting that frustrated residents frequently insist they would rather 
be told now if they would not be allowed to return.102 Anger in the public erupted again 
when LDP Party and coalition members issued a public report frankly admitting that 
some areas may never be reoccupied and calling for government assistance to help 
residents permanently relocate.103 
3. Environmental Radiation Standards 
Though its beginnings predate the disaster with cozy relationships between 
government leaders and regulators promoting the nuclear industry, the heart of the 
current public trust crisis for Fukushima is the fear of radiation.104 As mentioned in the 
discussion of risk communication literature above, radiation exposure and health risk is a 
technical matter that can be challenging to communicate to people during nonemergency 
situations, let alone during a crisis. An issue that hampered clear communication for the 
Japanese public was that officials initially relied on dose standards for normal plant 
operations that did not account for the emergency state, forcing them to relax protection 
standards as the situation continued. These changes contributed to mistrust in official 
government information about radiation safety. Furthermore, the central and local 
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governments disagreed about safety levels and appropriate protection measures, had poor 
information sharing mechanisms, and provided inconsistent messaging.105  
By the end of July 2011, the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan announced its 
intent to manage exposure levels to below 20 mSv/year in the near term with the long 
term goal of reducing exposures to 1 mSv/year.106 The concept that evolved over the next 
five months through the deliberations of the Cabinet’s Working Group for Risk 
Management of Low-Dose Radiation was to first ensure the stability of the plant itself, 
then begin lifting restrictions in areas with estimated doses of 20 mSv/year or less. For 
each such area, they would set a reference target, such as 10 mSv/year within the next 
two years and 5 mSv/year within the following year until the ultimate target of 1 
mSv/year is reached. Children’s living environments (schools, daycares, parks, etc.) have 
the stricter target of 1 mSv/year from the outset. In order to achieve the reductions, the 
governments would undertake aggressive, prioritized decontamination measures to 
remove radiation from the environment as quickly as possible. The plan also includes 
provisions for public deliberations and education campaigns, including cultivation of 
local experts on the safety of low dose radiation exposure, information transparency, 
radiation measurement instruments throughout repopulated areas, and health monitoring 
and support.107 
The evacuation and restricted zones that the Nuclear Emergency Response 
Headquarters established as of the end of April remained mostly intact until September 
30, 2011. See Figure 2. At that time, the Headquarters announced that certain areas that 
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had been evacuated primarily as a precaution due to the instability at the plant, as 
opposed to actual contamination, were ready to be lifted based on restoration plans that 
the five affected municipalities had been preparing since August. These zones, the 
“evacuation-prepared area in case of emergency” includes portions of Hirono town, 
Naraha town, Kawauchi village, Tamura city and Minamisoma city. Prior to lifting the 
orders, the governments (national, prefectural, and municipal) conducted monitoring in 
the areas, particularly at schools, playgrounds and daycare centers, to verify 
environmental radiation levels were within their designated standards.108 
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Figure 2.  Deliberate Evacuation Area and Specific Spots Recommended for 
Evacuation as of June 2011 from Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry, Japan.109 
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Ten weeks later, the headquarters announced that the reactors had progressed to 
“a condition equivalent to cold shutdown.” This means the government anticipates 
minimal risk of further explosions or major releases that would affect the public provided 
careful protective measures are adhered to during the continuing decommission 
process.110 It also triggered the further reconfiguring of the evacuation zones in April 
2012 and reoccupation for portions of Kawauchi village, Tamura city, and Minamisoma 
city.111 
The effect of disagreements and communications failures between the central and 
local governmental officials on public perceptions is exemplified by the delays in 
reclassification of Namie’s evacuation zones. Namie Mayor Tamotsu Baba suspended 
discussions on the reclassification with the central government for months because of 
disagreement over damage compensation and payment for the town health monitoring 
program.112 
The IAEA highlights the central and local governments’ extensive stakeholder 
engagement efforts in its January 2014 report on its mission to assess progress of the 
decontamination of offsite areas. This finding indicates that Japan is learning and 
improving risk communication procedures as the recovery progresses. Especially of note 
is that “key local community figures have been motivated to lead on engagement issues, 
gaining the trust of their communities. The national government is encouraging local 
authorities to conduct extensive consultations with local communities, and is respecting 
their outcome.” The IAEA team also specifically praised the outreach efforts linked with 
the Decontamination Information Plaza in Fukushima City as a best practice for 
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stakeholder engagement related to setting and managing environmental radiation 
standards during the recovery.113 
Despite these improvements, the central government came under fire as recently 
as March 2014 for withholding environmental radiation level data from the public while 
the data was reviewed and recalibrated due to accuracy concerns. The data was collected 
from newly placed dosimeters in three municipalities (Iitate, Tamura, and Kawauchi) in 
areas where evacuation orders were expected soon to be lifted. According to the Japan 
Daily Press, the readings from the newer dosimeters were higher than expected, so 
officials feared residents would be frightened about returning.  
This story demonstrates the hazard of changing official standards midstream. The 
story claims the central government planned to adjust the assumptions of average indoor 
versus outdoor time that would be used to determine re-occupancy safety in order to fit 
the new readings within published safe exposure levels.114 In April, the Minister of 
Industry apologized for the delay in publicly releasing the report and cabinet staff 
indicated it was due to the need to fully consult with all involved officials.115 
At the time of the release of the report involving dosimeter readings in Tamura, 
Kawauchi, and Iitate, the central government indicated a panel was considering the value 
of using individual dosimeter readings as the basis for setting decontamination levels 
rather than estimating dose based on environmental readings. IAEA encouraged the study 
and the direction of individual dose measurement in its January 2014 decontamination 
mission report.116 In June, 2014 the Ministry of Environment unveiled its plan in a 
meeting with municipal officials. Officials from the city of Date had participated in 
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testing the plan and welcomed the proposal, as it would likely result in less 
decontamination work to meet the standards. The city of Tamura reacted with concern 
that the change would only increase anxiety for residents. Some outside experts agreed 
that the new policy would reduce unnecessary decontamination work. Others noted that 
the low individual dosimeter levels in tests reflect increased actual indoor time due to 
residents’ fear of exposure outdoors.117 Thus, the results would not accurately reflect 
residents’ desired future daily habits.  
Many radiation and health experts believe the actual health risk in Japan is far 
lower than public perceptions. Some, such as Dr. Geraldine Thomas at the Chernobyl 
Tissue Bank at the Imperial College London, say this is primarily due to poor public 
information efforts.118 As described earlier, the WHO report assessed that the Fukushima 
accident exposure will result in no appreciable increase of cancer risk in the general 
population, in part due to the protective measures undertaken in Japan.119 The IAEA’s 
January 2014 decontamination mission report and other experts recommend more open 
and direct communication with people in the affected communities to help them 
understand the relative risk—relative to background radiation and relative to Chernobyl 
and similar human-caused releases. Specifically, IAEA emphasizes Japanese officials 
could do a better job helping the public understand that dose levels below 20 mSv/year 
with a long term goal to get below 1 mSv are within international standards.120  
4. Discrimination and Stigma  
Once evacuated, Fukushima residents faced various difficulties, including bias 
based on fear that they carried contamination with them on their bodies or cars.121 
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Evacuees describe being banned from using public baths or giving blood, cars being 
vandalized, and children getting taunted and shunned at school.122 Despite a national 
policy against issuing radiation screening certificates to evacuees, local governments 
reluctantly began to provide them in response to the overwhelming demand from 
residents who faced discrimination without them.123 Most parents are nervous about 
raising children in an environment with low dose radiation levels. Parents of young girls 
worry about their future marriage prospects due to the taint of radiation exposure.124 
Official public statements and government documents frequently note that the 
government will work to counteract “harmful rumors” that are negatively affecting 
Fukushima citizens and businesses. Some of the supplemental central government 
subsidies provided to communities specify this type of public information initiative as 
one of the intended uses.125 Fukushima Prefecture has invested in its Future From 
Fukushima marketing campaign and a highly visible food safety monitoring system to 
rebuild the reputation of local goods. Japan imposed stricter standards for radiation 
content of food samples in April 2012.126 
Overcoming negative perceptions about radiation danger in Fukushima products 
continues to be a battle. Consumer Affairs Agency surveys show that public confidence 
in the safety of food products from Fukushima within Japan had been rising but dipped 
again in late 2014, even though Japan’s standards are more strict than the U.S. and 
Europe.127 Some government officials believe the lower polls are due to widespread 
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media exposure of a popular graphic novel storyline that involved visitors to the nuclear 
plant getting nosebleeds.128 
E. RECOVERY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
You get depressed when you can’t see your future. 
—Chairman, temporary housing residents’ association in Japan129 
After a disaster that results in a large number of displaced families and businesses, 
indeed whole communities, as the Japan disaster has, outreach with residents and 
businesses during the temporary relocation period is a critical community function. 
Closely related to public information management is ensuring stakeholder involvement 
during the recovery planning process. Post disaster recovery planning is a useful tool for 
governments to organize how they will manage the recovery, involve citizens in the 
decision making for the community’s future, and convey to them important information 
about the recovery process.  
1. National Planning and Legal Frameworks For Recovery 
At the national level, this process had its roots with the appointment of the 
Reconstruction Design Council by the Cabinet one month after the disaster. The Design 
Council established seven basic principles for the reconstruction that guided its June 25 
report, Hope beyond the Disaster. The council and supporting study group were 
populated primarily by academics (urban planning, architecture, engineering, economics, 
social sciences, etc.) but also included three governors of heavily impacted prefectures, a 
mayor, a nongovernmental disaster support organization, several corporate leaders, a 
Buddhist clergy, and a news columnist.130  
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The Design Council report includes a chapter devoted to the nuclear disaster. It 
calls for swift resolution of the ongoing emergency at the plant itself; assistance and 
health monitoring and management for residents; removal of all contamination from 
Fukushima; and establishment of a technology center for renewable energy, 
decontamination and environmental restoration, and medical support, particularly for 
radiation exposure.131  
Overall, several researchers credit the government of Japan for acting quickly to 
make legislative changes, authorize supplemental budgets, set up new organizational 
structures to manage recovery and reconstruction, and promote participatory planning.132 
By May 2011, the central government’s organizational structure for planning and 
managing the recovery and reconstruction after the Great East Japan Earthquake and the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster was taking shape. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Japan Central Government Disaster Management Structure as of  
May 09, 2011133 
The Basic Act on Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
passed by the Diet June 20, 2011, acknowledged the Design Council and established the 
Reconstruction Headquarters constituted of cabinet ministers and support staff. It 
authorized a standalone Reconstruction Agency that would replace the headquarters once 
fully instituted.134  
By July 29, 2011, the Reconstruction Headquarters published the Basic 
Guidelines for Reconstruction, based on the Design Council’s report, which promoted 
prefectural and village recovery planning and outlined provisions for national support and 
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financial assistance.135 The Basic Guidelines set the goal of reconstruction completion 
within ten years.  
The Basic Act on Reconstruction also established a framework for a system of 
special zones for reconstruction. The zone system would provide tax breaks and lending 
incentives, ease eligibility for public housing, special procedures for business permits, 
and simplify land-use restructuring to stimulate investment and rebuilding in the 
impacted areas. 
To address recovery of the areas impacted by the nuclear accident specifically, the 
Diet enacted the Act on Special Measures for Fukushima Reconstruction and 
Revitalization on March 30, 2012. Key provisions included in the act are declarations that 
the national government pay for remediation and reconstruction of infrastructure in 
Fukushima, planning and assistance for revitalization of industry, support for the 
prefecture to conduct a health survey of residents, monitoring of radiation in agricultural 
and fisheries products, tax benefits for residents and businesses, and reaffirmation of 
local control for municipalities. Notably, the Diet stated clearly that the policies for 
reconstruction would respect local community autonomy and support sustaining local 
communities.136 Even at this early point, it is not surprising that there were discussions 
about whether the vacated communities would survive at all. The act also tasked the 
Cabinet to develop Basic Guidelines for Fukushima Reconstruction and Revitalization in 
consultation with the governor of Fukushima and the affected municipalities, which they 
completed in July 2012.  
2. Prefectural and Municipal Planning 
The Fukushima Prefecture published two editions of its revitalization plan, the 
first in December 2011 and an update in June 2012. The plan’s goals are simultaneously 
lofty and poignantly realistic. Three of the twelve priorities involve revitalizing industry 
and promoting new sector hubs for renewable energy and health and medical production. 
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At the same time, the performance target for restoring the prefecture population by 2020 
(down to 40,900 in 2012 from 146,400 pre-disaster) is listed simply as “to be increased.” 
One of the key recovery measures listed for Prefecture-wide emphasis is to ensure 
community health through monitoring surveys and public radiation education campaigns. 
The plan emphasizes throughout consultation with returned and evacuated residents to 
identify and address requirements for everyday activities.137  
A number of towns, including Namie and Minamisoma established citizen and 
expert committees to inform the vision setting and planning process. In addition to its 
outreach to adults, Minamisoma city sent teams to schools to seek the views of children 
on the city’s future. To facilitate local planning, the prefecture and towns affected by the 
radiological contamination have been conducting surveys of evacuated residents either on 
their own or with university assistance to track where they are living and gauge their 
desire to return to their hometown. Some surveys also ask additional questions about how 
residents are coping physically and mentally, their current economic status, whether they 
are working, etc.138  
With each iteration, fewer say they hold out hope for returning and most of those 
are older without young children.139 The town of Okuma saw an increase from nine 
percent to 30 percent saying they would not return in the first four months from June to 
October 2011.140 Whereas in January 2012, 64 percent of residents from the town of 
Namie said they hoped to return, the latest results in August 2014 indicate almost 50 
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percent have decided not to come back, up over ten points from the year prior. An 
additional 24.6 percent are undecided.141  
The town of Okuma’s experience demonstrates the necessarily iterative recovery 
planning process that the uncertainties of the Fukushima situation require. The town held 
its first recovery planning meeting June 3 and a public meeting to discuss the town’s 
future July 29. By March 30, 2012, the town circulated a first draft recovery plan for 
public comment and published the first iteration in September. The town also undertook 
specific planning for decontamination, temporary housing, managing reconstruction 
grants, and temporary storage for contaminated materials. It published an updated 
reconstruction plan in March 2014. 
Prior to the disaster, the town of Okuma could boast that its population of 11,500 
had increased slightly in recent years, contrary to Fukushima Prefecture’s overall 
downward trend. The town economy is based on agriculture and the nuclear plant it co-
hosts. The earthquake and tsunami destroyed 30 houses in Okuma and caused significant 
infrastructure damage. The largest group of Okuma evacuees to move together (3,700) 
found shelter and later temporary housing in Aizu Wakamatsu City, Fukushima 
Prefecture.142 The town began cooperating by April with the municipal government in 
Aizu Wakamatsu City. They established schools for the Okuma students in elementary 
through high school levels within just over a month. Okuma later established 
coordination with Iwaki City and Koriyama as host communities for temporary housing 
for Okuma residents.143 
By its March 2012 plan draft, the town had established four initial priorities for 
focusing its recovery efforts. 1) Decontamination of the whole town within 10 years; 2) 
Due to its initially lower radiation levels, prioritize the Okawara area for decontamination 
within two years to serve as a base for decommissioning and decontamination work; 3) 
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Within five years, develop municipal and educational facilities in Iwaki City as the base 
of a temporary town near Okuma; and 4) In the near-term improve temporary facilities in 
the Aizu Wakamatsu host community.144 
Decontamination work in Okawara subsequently began in December 2012. 
Although earlier town documents acknowledged a 10-year target to decontaminate 
Okuma, the local assembly adopted a five year no return policy in late 2012.145 The 
Mayor of Okuma admitted to an Asahi Shimbun survey of municipal officials that it 
would be 11 to 15 years before his community could be resettled.146 These fluctuations in 
recovery goals are confusing and exasperating for residents trying to map out their own 
plan for recovery. In its April 2013 status summary, the town highlighted its frustrating 
predicament of attempting to plan for the future amidst a lack of consensus on safe 
exposure levels and uncertain timeframes by stating, “The final decision to return to the 
town rests on individual residents, but there should be objective and scientific basis that 
they can refer to in making their decision (especially for women and children).”147 
Okuma’s updated reconstruction plan of March 2014 represents more certainty 
and planning detail. It is organized in five year increments to 2033, a long-term jump to 
2053 for full decommissioning of the plant and decontamination in all restricted areas. It 
includes appealing site sketches for the base town in Okawara. Improving the current 
living conditions of evacuees is a central theme of the plan.148 
F. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
If one could describe it as an advantage, the households and businesses affected 
by the nuclear disaster do receive more financial assistance than those whose losses were 
only related to the earthquake and/or tsunami. 
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1. Governmental Disaster Assistance 
As described earlier under Japan’s disaster management system, the Act on 
Support for Livelihood Recovery of Disaster Victims provides for payments of up to 3 
million yen (approximately $25,500) after certain larger disasters to households when the 
home is destroyed.149 By November 2014, the central government had issued 115,000 
such grants for livelihood rebuilding and completed construction on 14 percent of the 
estimated 21,895 planned public housing units to address the wider disaster. The 
government also has invested 17.5 trillion yen into loans, subsidies, and temporary 
buildings for business operators impacted by the overall disaster.150  
News reports indicate Japan is struggling to expend the grants made and meet 
planned reconstruction timelines for the overall disaster. Reuters reported in October 
2014 that approximately 60 percent of the $50 billion the central government has paid for 
infrastructure and public housing construction to local governments in the three hardest 
hit prefectures, including Fukushima, remains unspent. Factors contributing to the delays 
include labor shortages, increased costs for building materials, difficulty in acquiring land 
for relocations, and resource diversions for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics infrastructure 
development.151 The reality after very large disasters is that planning the reconstruction 
and rebuilding take time, not just money. 
2. TEPCO Compensation 
TEPCO began making provisional lump sum compensation payments to evacuees 
April 16, 2011. The first payments ranged from 750,000 to 1 million yen ($7,500–
$10,000) per household. TEPCO distributed additional payments to individuals of up to 
300,000 yen each by the end of 2011.152 Agricultural and fishery cooperatives provided 
                                                 
149 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Disaster Management in Japan,” 23.  
150 Reconstruction Agency, Government of Japan, “The Process and Prospects for Reconstruction,” 
2014, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/pdf/2014_pd.pdf, 2.  
151 Taiga Uranaka, and Antoni Slodkowski, “Special Report: Tsunami Evacuees Caught in $30 
Billion Japan Money Trap,” Reuters, October 31, 2014, http://www.trust.org/item/20141031005413-
ux955/?source=jtOtherNews1  
152 Umeda, Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, 32–4.   
63 
bridge loans to members out of their own reserves and also distributed payments to 
members on TEPCO’s behalf starting in May 2011.153  
Initially, the 1961 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage governed the 
compensation framework, including the establishment of a Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation April 11, 2011. The Reconciliation 
Committee has passed a series of guidelines since 2011 to clarify or expand 
compensation schemes as the situation has progressed. The Reconciliation Committee’s 
initial priorities were to ensure assistance for those with obvious damages: the evacuees 
and businesses subject to shipping and sales restrictions. The Reconciliation Committee 
set up the Center for Dispute Resolution for Compensating Damages in August 2011 to 
address disagreements on compensation outside of court.154  
The Diet enacted the Act on Emergency Measures against Damage from the 2011 
Nuclear Accident on August 5, 2011 to allow the government to make partial 
compensation payments directly to facilitate timely assistance. Under the new act, the 
government provided provisional payments to tourism operators negatively affected by 
the stigma of radiation contamination in late 2011. The government is authorized to seek 
reimbursement from TEPCO for the provisional compensation.155 TEPCO later began 
compensation for tourism operators directly in October 2012.156  
The compensation system includes a consolation payment to families of 2.5–5 
million yen (approximately $20,700–$41,400) for deaths attributed to the effects of the 
accident, including the mandatory evacuation. A local panel of medical doctors and 
lawyers reviews the circumstances to determine whether the death can be attributed to 
health deterioration due to the extended displacement caused by the accident. As of June 
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2014, the panels certified 1,729 deaths of Fukushima residents as related to the 
accident.157  
The second supplement to the Reconciliation Committee guidelines in March 
2012 directed a lump sum payment of six million yen (approximately $60,000) for 
psychological suffering for each person who cannot return to a home located in the 
“difficult to return” zone earlier than five years. It also recommended TEPCO develop a 
scheme to compensate property owners in that zone for the full value of their land and 
home “in order to provide prompt relief for the victims.”158 TEPCO announced in April 
it was working with national and local officials to determine the best method for meeting 
this requirement. The deliberations included public meetings with evacuees and lasted a 
full year.159 TEPCO began accepting applications to pay real estate value compensation 
to residents and business owners in March 2013.160  
The Science Ministry estimated that as of the end of September 2013, TEPCO had 
paid to a family of four on average 90 million yen (approximately $745,000) in total 
compensation payments. The Reconciliation Committee announced in October 2013 
some flexibility in the guideline that the 100,000 yen per month payments for 
psychological suffering would end one year after evacuation orders are lifted. As of 
October 2013, 84,000 residents continued to receive the monthly payments for 
psychological distress. The committee determined that payments would be made 
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regardless if residents return to their hometown and individual circumstances could result 
in continued payments beyond one year.161  
In December 2013, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters announced a 
profound shift in policy: a cabinet decision to enhance support for evacuees to either 
return home or restart their lives in a new location. The announcement referenced a 
December 26 Reconciliation Committee decision to provide additional compensation to 
evacuees for building new housing to return to their home community or to purchase a 
new home elsewhere. These announcements followed a November 2013, Reconciliation 
Committee recommendation that TEPCO compensate those evacuees who purchased a 
new home in another place, 50–100 percent of the difference of the land value.162 Per 
NHK, the new policy allows for payment of 75 percent of the difference in value for 
those who buy homes elsewhere.163 
In order to ensure TEPCO would be able to meet its responsibilities for the 
massive compensation payments, the government created the Nuclear Damage 
Compensation Facilitation Corporation under a new act. The Corporation has the power 
to issue government-guaranteed bonds or take out loans from existing financial 
institutions in order to provide loans or other forms of financial support to a nuclear 
operator that needs assistance to make required compensation payments. The Corporation 
began providing such support to TEPCO in November 2011.164 
TEPCO reports that as of February 13, 2015 it has made compensation payments 
to individuals and businesses totaling over 4,675 billion yen (approximately $39.4 
billion). That includes almost equal amounts of just over 2,000 billion yen each for 
forcibly evacuated households and business entities, and over 353 billion yen for 
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voluntary evacuees whose homes have not been or no longer were in restricted zones.165 
These payments do not include TEPCO’s costs to decommission the plant or 
contributions toward decontamination of the environment. 
Compensation support for voluntary evacuees remains controversial. The term 
“voluntary evacuees” includes those who choose not to return after their neighborhood is 
removed from the occupancy restrictions. TEPCO began providing compensation at the 
behest of the Reconciliation Committee for voluntary evacuees from certain communities 
beginning in June 2012. This amount is a flat rate encompassing both psychological 
distress and evacuation costs, of 400,000 yen for children and pregnant women and 
80,000 yen for all other people in the designated eligible areas.166 A local paper estimates 
there were still as many as 35,000 voluntary evacuees as of January 2014. A large group 
of 16,000 evacuees living in Tokyo sent a petition to the central government in April 
2014 seeking more long term assistance.167  
Recognizing the bureaucratic complexities facing disaster survivors, Japan 
expanded legal assistance with the Act Concerning Special Legal Aid by the Japan Legal 
Support Center to Assist Victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2012. For 
Fukushima evacuees, the Special Act established a special procedure for making damage 
claims directly to TEPCO. It also includes alternative dispute resolution procedures for 
nuclear disaster claims. The Special Act removes for 2011 disaster survivors income and 
asset thresholds that normally determine who may receive legal fee loans from the Japan 
Legal Support Center.168 In addition to providing mobile support consultations in areas 
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where evacuees are currently living, the Center’s website provides phone and email 
contacts for not only legal support but other social service providers such as mental and 
physical health, housing, financial counseling, and insurance.169 The new Nuclear 
Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation is also providing consultations, seminars, 
and information to survivors about how to apply to TEPCO and how to use the 
alternative dispute resolution system.170 
G. TEMPORARY HOUSING 
Japan has implemented a number of policy changes to improve disaster housing in 
the wake of the Kobe earthquake of 1995. The large, multi-family disaster public housing 
buildings relied upon after the Kobe earthquake tended to scatter former communities and 
isolate the elderly. One improvement after the 2011 disaster is the expansion of housing 
options offered, such as sublets of vacant rental housing (a longstanding practice in the 
U.S.), as well as construction of small, wood frame temporary units using local materials 
and construction firms. The magnitude of the housing need elevated the importance of 
multiple options for housing support.171 Traditionally, Japanese policy provides little 
support for individuals to reconstruct their own homes.172  
Japanese disaster housing experts have encouraged policies that preserve 
communities and support livelihood reconstruction, such as support for municipalities to 
develop community consensus and manage housing recovery efforts.173 Some experts 
have also recommended a re-distribution of housing and recovery responsibilities such 
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that prefectures take away some of the burdens of struggling local governments.174 In 
addition to 10,000 pre-planned and contracted housing units provided by the Japan 
Prefabricated Construction Suppliers and Manufacturers Association, Fukushima 
Prefecture solicited local builders to build wooden and log units. With planning, 
architectural, and engineering assistance from universities and associations, the 
Prefecture developed 6,000 additional units through this novel initiative. Fukushima 
purchased rather than leased the units, which allowed for more flexibility in duration of 
use and reuse of materials.175  
Despite lessons after the Kobe earthquake, local governments in the Tohoku 
region have employed lottery systems to distribute permanent housing to elderly and 
disabled residents without concern for co-locating neighbors or relations close 
together.176 The new sublet framework provides higher quality housing but results in 
residents being dispersed within host cities far away from home rather than grouped 
together with former neighbors.177 More recent reports indicate officials are making an 
effort to facilitate the preservation of close ties among neighbors as they move from 
temporary housing to newly constructed, permanent public housing.178  
Local officials have made significant efforts to create a mini-municipality away 
from home by siting temporary offices and schools near the largest groups of their own 
residents’ temporary housing.179 Towns have set up community centers and senior 
centers for their residents.180  
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Regardless, surveys show that many evacuee families are separated from family 
they lived with pre-disaster. The cramped housing units limit the ability of extended 
families to stay together. Also, some families live apart for work. The phrase “atomic 
divorce” has emerged to describe couples splitting over disagreements about living in 
Fukushima and their children’s health, or simply due to the stresses of being displaced.181 
One of the limitations of some of the temporary housing units is their unsuitability for 
long term occupation. Residents complain of moldy ceilings, crumbling walls, and rotting 
steps. Fukushima Prefecture conducts inspections on the units annually but must address 
over 300 repair requests each month.182 
The prefecture’s plans to build 4,890 permanent public housing units in 15 
locations have hit a number of delays. One project for a 16-unit apartment complex in 
Aizu Wakamatsu could not attract any bidders for construction within the established 
budget. In some cases, land acquisition negotiations drag on or site clearance of wooded 
areas and farmland are taking longer than expected.183 
H. OFFSITE REMEDIATION 
When considering the progress of recovery planning and the decontamination 
process, it’s illustrative to review the timeline of the stabilization and decommissioning 
of the Fukushima Daiichi plant itself. TEPCO and the government estimate the 
decommissioning process will take 40 years to complete. As described in Section D, from 
March until mid-December 2011, the plant was still in an unstable state. The Nuclear 
Emergency Response Headquarters announced first in late December 2011 that cold 
shutdown finally had been achieved.184 The insecurity during this period had a ripple 
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effect on all recovery efforts for Fukushima Prefecture because of the ongoing potential 
for additional releases and re-contamination. In the years since, radiation discharges 
during plant debris removal operations and leaks of contaminated water stored onsite 
have continued to try public confidence.185 
Within this environment of uncertainty, the government established its initial 
framework for managing remediation of contamination in the neighboring communities 
and prefectures with the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of 
Radioactive Pollution, in August 2011. The act delineates two categories of areas to be 
remediated: the Special Decontamination Area, inclusive of the 20 km radius from the 
plant and areas with environmental radiation levels above 20 mSv/year; and the Intensive 
Contamination Survey Area encompassing those areas with levels between 1 and 20 
mSv/year.186 The central government (Ministry of Environment) is responsible for 
developing decontamination and waste management plans and directly managing work in 
the Special Decontamination Area. The prefectures and municipalities are responsible for 
developing plans and managing the work in the Intensive Contamination Survey Areas 
with technical support from the central government. TEPCO is liable for compensating 
the respective governments for the remediation costs.187 
Based on the act, the Ministry of Environment’s January 2012 Decontamination 
Roadmap for the Special Decontamination Areas prioritized remediation work in the 
areas with less than 20 mSv/y and between 20 to 50 mSv/y.188 The strategy is to facilitate 
return of evacuees more quickly by reopening the least affected areas first. 
                                                 
185 Miki Aoki, “Study: Cesium from Fukushima Debris Removal Likely Spread 50 Km,” The Asahi 
Shimbun, July 16, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201407160064; Miki Aoki, 
“Radioactive Dust Released during Fukushima Cleanup Reaches as Far as Miyagi Prefecture,” The Asahi 
Shimbun, July 31, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201407310044; Ian 
Sample, “Fukushima Two Years On: A Dirty Job with no End in Sight,” The Guardian, December 3, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/dec/03/fukushima-daiichi-tsunami-nuclear-cleanup-japan  
186 International Atomic Energy Agency, Final Report: The Follow-Up IAEA, 5.  
187 Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive 
Materials Discharged by the NPS Accident Associated with the Tohoku District—Off the Pacific Ocean 
Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011 (2011), 25, 
http://josen.env.go.jp/en/framework/pdf/special_act.pdf?20130118.   
188 Ministry of Environment, Government of Japan, “‘Decontamination Roadmap’ for the Special 
Decontamination Areas (Outline),” 2012, http://josen.env.go.jp/en/roadmap/ 
71 
Decontamination of essential public facilities such as town halls, roads, and water 
infrastructure would be completed earliest in these areas. The central government would 
undertake initially only demonstration projects in the areas with levels higher than 50 
mSv/y. 
The remediation program has faced sharp criticism due to missed completion 
targets in communities like Namie, extended from the original estimate of March 2014 to 
2017.189 Heavy snows over the 2012/2013 winter limited access, but many believe the 
Ministry of Environment’s original roadmap was overly optimistic given the enormity of 
the undertaking.190 The process is painstaking. Once the essential infrastructure and 
municipal building are cleaned, government sponsored decontamination teams tackle the 
residential areas. Homeowners clean out the inside of their homes on daytrips after the 
teams complete a 10 to 14 day process of cleaning roofs and gutters, then removing 
surface grass, dirt, and shrubs.191 In addition to the sheer vastness of the task, 
recontamination occurs in areas near hilly terrain when rainfall carries contaminants back 
down into the cleaned areas.192 
Delays are in part due to planning and preparing safe temporary and interim 
storage for contaminated materials. Managing the disaster debris contaminated with 
radiation as well as the large volumes of polluted topsoil, shrubbery, and other materials 
generated by the remediation efforts has been an iterative process for both the central and 
local governments. To the extent possible, they sort, recycle, and burn some waste to 
reduce the volume. Workers moved most disaster related contaminated debris from 
coastal areas, with the exception of larger items like ships, to interim storage locations by 
the end of 2012.193 Larger intact items like boats and vehicles require tracking down 
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owners and permission for removal. Approximately, 70 fishing boats cast ashore by the 
tsunami still litter the Fukushima coast as of the end of 2014.194  
The central and local governmental authorities have struggled to identify viable 
interim storage locations in or near the 11 hardest hit communities. Residents and local 
officials are wary that temporary sites will become permanent over time leaving their 
communities with the stigma of radiation forever.195 
It was a major breakthrough in late August 2014 when Fukushima Prefecture and 
the towns of Okuma and Futuba finally agreed after lengthy negotiations to accept the 
construction of interim storage facilities in the two towns. The Pprefecture insists that the 
central government identify long term storage solutions outside of Fukushima to take 
effect after 30 years. The central government also offered additional subsidies for various 
economic and social revitalization initiatives in the Prefecture and two communities.196  
In October 2013, the IAEA conducted a follow up mission to its 2011 review of 
Japan’s strategy and organizational mechanisms for offsite remediation and published a 
report noting progress, best practices, and areas for continued improvement in January 
2014. Some key practices the IAEA team highlights as positive progress that relate to 
community relocations include:197  
1. The overall investment in financial resources, technical assistance, and 
coordination of multiple supporting organizations to minimize exposure 
and enable people and communities to return; 
2. Central and local efforts to foster local leadership to engage stakeholders 
meaningfully in the decision making process; 
3. Comprehensive, systematic information development to support decision 
making and provide progress reporting; 
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4. Assessment and comparison of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different remediation methods; 
5. Monitoring, progress, and successful alternative methods for agricultural 
land remediation; 
6. Practical buffer remediation (20 meters) of forestland contiguous to 
residential, agricultural, and other occupied spaces; 
7. Advancement of temporary and interim storage facility solutions, 
including application of incineration techniques to decrease volume that 
also minimizes emissions exposure for the public;  
IAEA also offers suggestions to Japan to continue to improve remediation 
programs and increase public support for the efforts. The recommendations include a 
more prominent role for the Nuclear Regulation Authority in remediation oversight as 
well as access for independent assessments of safety related to storage facility 
development. The team urges continued balancing of the risk to decontamination workers 
versus benefits to people and ecosystems for forestland and similar areas. Several 
recommendations focus on communication with the public to improve understanding of 
the long term nature of the 1 m/Sv per year goal and the tradeoffs involved with a single 
target reference level standard for environmental radiation. Tradeoffs mentioned include 
increased waste production and storage requirements, and the diversion of resources 
away from infrastructure reestablishment. The team also suggests it may increase public 
confidence in decisions if the risk communication and stakeholder engagement efforts 
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I. COMMUNITY RESETTLEMENT 
Those of us who belong to the older generation feel that we received this 
town from our ancestors, and we feel great pain that we cannot pass it 
down to our children. 
—Tamotsu Baba, Mayor of Namie, Japan199 
How do you know when a community has recovered from a disaster? What does 
the “new normal” look like and who decides when it is achieved? The answers to these 
nagging questions are unique to the affected community—its leaders, its residents, and 
businesses. For a community that completely relocates temporarily due to radiological 
contamination, it is not enough to just clean up and rebuild. The real hard work is 
bringing people and businesses back. 
Based on the advance notices after the December stabilization of the nuclear 
plant, the government lifted evacuation restrictions in portions of Tamura city, Kawauchi, 
and Minamisoma in April 2012. Portions of Iitate followed three months later. However, 
it has taken time for people and businesses to move back and in March 2015 all are still 
struggling to rebound. For the 11 communities in the Special Decontamination Area, the 
key to resettlement is completing the decontamination work and building public 
confidence that not only will they be safe, but they will be able to work, buy necessities, 
get medical assistance, and send their kids to school or daycare nearby. 
The mayor of Kawauchi, Yuko Endo, has been a prominent champion of 
resettling the village as quickly as possible to ensure the community does not remain a 
ghost town. The village reopened municipal offices and schools immediately in April 
2012 as soon as the evacuation restrictions were lifted even though much of the 
community lies within the 20 km zone that was still off limits and few residents were 
returning at the time. The mayor pushed hard to reopen the village, but acknowledged it 
would be a slow process for residents to get comfortable with the idea: “Villagers who 
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are concerned about radiation can wait and see before they decide…We want to start 
rebuilding the village with those who can come back.”200  
A year later in March 2013, Kawauchi’s returned population stood at 420 out of 
the 3,000 displaced in 2011. Most returned residents, approximately 65 percent, were 
over the age of 65, a significant rise from Kawauchi’s overall 34 percent senior 
population. The elementary school enrolled only 16 students in its first year after 
reopening. However, with a few restaurants and gas stations open, new apartments ready 
to accept residents, and several major employers committing to open as of March 2013, 
Kawauchi’s progress was arguably among the best of the 11 municipalities.201 
It was in this same month that the Ministry of Environment announced that the 
decontamination work was behind schedule in almost all of the 11 municipalities, 
including Kawauchi. It took another full year, until April 2014 for the village to grant 
short term overnight stays so that people could prepare their homes and businesses for 
permanent return. Kawauchi’s was the second portion of the 20 km zone to reopen in 
October 2014. Tamura city’s Miyakoji district had opened in April. About half of 
Kawauchi’s original population had returned by the time the restrictions were lifted. The 
government and TEPCO have agreed that the 100,000-yen monthly compensation for 
psychological distress will continue for one year after evacuation restrictions are lifted 
whether residents return or not.202  
Fukushima Prefecture overall is experiencing some other emerging bright spots in 
its recovery progress. The Fukushima Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
announced in October 2014 that over 1,000 pregnant women chose to follow traditional 
practice and give birth in their parents’ hometown in Fukushima in fiscal year 2013. The 
number had dropped to below 600 in 2011 after the disaster.203 Fukushima’s birthrate has 
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also returned to pre-disaster levels overall.204 Authorities were able to open two major 
roadways in late 2014, the Joban Expressway and Route 6, which connect communities 
in the restricted zones to other prefectures. Officials hope the improved access will 
facilitate reconstruction and make it more convenient for residents and businesses to 
return.205 Additionally, in August 2014 the National Federation of Agricultural 
Cooperative Associations resumed Fukushima rice exports to Singapore for the first 
time.206 
Unfortunately, resettlement remains a far off goal for the communities such as 
Namie and Futuba that lie primarily within the zone designated as “difficult to return for 
a long time” (see areas marked in pink on Figure 4). The central government’s Cabinet 
Office updated its estimates in June 2014 to predict they will be able to resettle those 
areas first in 2021.207  
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Figure 4.  Nuclear Evacuation Areas as of October 2014208 
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J. SUMMARY OF FUKUSHIMA CASE DESCRIPTION 
Imagine the perspective of disaster survivors struggling to keep life together over 
the last four years. Surrounded by the horrifying death and destruction of the tsunami, 
they left behind a home and a business, a farm, or a job for what was expected to be a few 
days. After weeks or months in a group shelter, they moved to hastily built temporary 
housing and may or may not be near former neighbors. They are allowed to return for 
short visits to retrieve items and maintain their house. Some people do not return at all 
due to health fears or because they cannot bear to look. Depending how far away they 
are, the visits may be infrequent and the house is showing signs of neglect. They apply to 
TEPCO and receive compensation payments once a month covering the initial evacuation 
and lodging costs, emotional distress, lost wages, etc. They endure snide comments from 
residents in their adopted town about not needing to work even though they may have 
only been able to find a part time job that pays lower wages. The projections they hear 
about how long it will be before they are allowed home seems to change every six 
months. Information about the progress of recovery at home in general is spotty and they 
do not always know what to believe.  
It is actually more difficult to imagine what those four years have been like for the 
town mayors struggling to retain a sense of community among evacuees and manage the 
planning and cleanup work from a temporary office in a neighboring jurisdiction. In the 
first year, they waited for the nuclear plant situation to stabilize, so it was impossible to 
estimate a return timeframe. They set up newsletters, webpages, and town hall meetings 
to attempt to keep residents informed and involved. They negotiated agreements with two 
or three host jurisdictions to bring together clusters of former residents in areas that could 
absorb the additional school children and offer adequate housing. Following the lead of 
national recovery planning initiatives, they invited residents and experts to craft 
revitalization strategies, temporary waste storage plans, and remediation roadmaps. They 
face a constant barrage of complaints about the missed targets for remediation goals, 
which they pass on to the central government agencies managing the tedious cleanup. 
They work the phones and email trying to attract large companies to return or new ones 
to move in using the central government revitalization zone incentives. Among their 
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many worries is whether enough medical and other service providers will return to 
support the rapidly aging population willing to come back. When the restricted area 
designation is lifted for a small part of town, they beg residents to return but struggle to 
enroll enough kids to fill a classroom, let alone a school. 
At the four year mark, restrictions are lifted for portions of four towns and 
remediation planning and work continues for the other seven hardest hit municipalities. 
Decontamination and repairs permitted the late 2014 reopening of two major sections of 
highway that connect the restricted areas to neighboring jurisdictions. The return of 
residents to the reopened areas of villages such as Tamura and Kawauchi is proceeding 
very slowly, with the higher percentage being elderly. While the number of residents who 
still hope to return continues to decline, it is too early to evaluate what impact the 
December 2013 policy shift to financially support people who decide to buy new homes 
elsewhere is having on population returns. See Figure 5, next page, for an overview 
timeline of major events related to the nuclear disaster recovery. 
The next chapter will distill the key recovery management practices of central, 
prefectural, and municipal leaders described in the policy themed sections of this chapter. 
The comparative analysis in Chapter V will assess the potential effectiveness of the 
identified key practices and compare them to the U.S. policy environment for potential 




Figure 5.  Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Major Recovery Events Timeline  
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Chapter IV describes the events and decisions related to the forced relocation of 
Fukushima communities after the March 2011 disaster as well as reactions from citizens, 
the media, other officials, and observers with academic or professional expertise.  
Following the same policy themes from Chapter IV, this chapter reviews notable 
disaster recovery management decisions and key practices from the case description and 
summarizes their potential for effectiveness based on known reactions and observations. 
Note, public reactions and perceptions of outcomes related to complicated recovery 
issues are multi-faceted. This summary necessarily simplifies the case study findings 
based on available observations. Section G discusses how the most promising practices 
might apply in the U.S based on the political/organizational, geographical, cultural, and 
public relations environment.  
A. KEY PRACTICES—PUBLIC INFORMATION/RISK COMMUNICATION 
On the one hand, public information/risk communication seems to be a capability 
with which government officials in Japan have struggled. Japan’s Fukushima experience 
demonstrates how critical early transparency and coordinated agreement on standards and 
related messaging are to establish and maintain public trust in official information and 
actions. Early faltering with public information during extreme crisis situations can sow 
mistrust that may not be recoverable. 
On the other hand, officials clearly exploited the latest technology and 
communications trends, quickly employing social media, websites, and blogs for 
outreach and posting maps and other technical impact information. The municipalities 
also leveraged traditional public engagement techniques such as newsletters, citizen 
committees, and town hall meetings to stay in touch with residents and develop recovery 
plans.  
It is not clear from the case study what mechanisms were most useful for the 
Prefecture and municipalities to establish and maintain contact with relocated residents. 
The case does indicate that regular contact between the community and dispersed 
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residents has been beneficial for promoting community cohesiveness and ensuring 
residents are aware of temporary re-entry opportunities, security arrangements, and 
available assistance. Setting up and testing the means for this tracking and 
communication in advance in the absence of time pressures and the stress of disruption 
would be easier than ad hoc arrangements post incident. 
The stories of evacuated residents encountering prejudice and stigma in host 
communities and officials reversing procedure to issue decontamination certificates to 
reduce discrimination indicates that public information efforts were not adequate in those 
areas. The ability of officials to be flexible and adjust policy to meet emerging needs is 
commendable. However, prior planning and strategic public information to educate 
people in host communities about radiation to ensure evacuees were welcomed rather 
than ostracized is a tool that could have alleviated some of these issues.209 
The effectiveness of efforts to educate the affected public about the potential 
health effects of radiation, self-protection measures, and the implications of offsite 
remediation decision making is a mixed bag. When the central government set an overall 
target to reduce dose to under 20 mSv/y for reoccupancy and a long term goal of 1 
mSv/y, it paved the way for more consistent messaging and coordinated remediation 
planning across the affected jurisdictions. As noted earlier, the IAEA decontamination 
mission team praised a number of risk communication practices including the personal 
leadership of several local officials and an information plaza set up in Fukushima City.210 
The University of Tokyo partnered with Fukushima Prefecture to test in person seminars 
as a means of radiation education and found they were relatively effective to ease anxiety 
and combat rumors and misinformation.211 The public continues to be mistrustful, in part 
due to the early precedents of lack of transparency and poor communications 
coordination. 
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Table 1.   Public Information/Risk Communication Key Practices Summary 
 
B. KEY PRACTICES—RECOVERY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE 
The case study indicates that the practice of planning for recovery after disasters 
and involving the community and other stakeholders in the process was actively applied 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake disaster. From the Reconstruction Design Council 
and the Working Group on Risk Management of Low-dose Radiation Exposure at the 
national level to the citizen and expert committees employed by the municipalities, 
examples of these practices abound. This impression is tempered with criticisms of the 
Key Practice Government Level Observations 
Establish and maintain trust Central  Early missteps; difficult to 
regain 




Improved after early stage 
Ensure direct contact between 
community and relocated 
residents 
Municipal Community cohesion; flow of 
information to residents about 
home community; 
participation in recovery 
planning 




Limited efforts resulted in 
discrimination and demands 
for decontamination 
certificates 
Local leader engagement Prefectural, Municipal Improved public trust 
In person radiation education 
seminars and stations 
Prefectural, Municipal Assisted residents to 
understand risk and manage 
dose; earlier identification of 
those needing more assistance 
Set national, flexible dose limit 
range for the incident 
Central Improved earlier confusion 
due to fluctuating/relaxed 
standards; likely facilitated 
earlier reoccupancy in some 
areas 
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Design Council membership, its lofty visions short on practical implementation, and the 
frustrating pettiness of inter-ministerial infighting typical of Japanese politics.212  
At the national level, Japan established a new, separate Reconstruction Agency to 
manage the rebuilding process. Despite the nod to local leadership in the Design Council 
report, Japan’s governmental system remains primarily centralized in nature, requiring a 
focused central mechanism to manage the rebuilding.213 The Reconstruction Agency has 
not stemmed criticisms of slow rebuilding in the face of the massive undertaking of 
planning and managing reconstruction after the tsunami’s devastation.  
One successful technique that is not commonly used in the U.S. after disasters is 
the population surveys the Fukushima prefecture and towns have regularly conducted 
since 2011. The surveys have provided residents an opportunity to anonymously voice 
opinions about returning and the standards they expect before they will come back. The 
towns have gleaned useful demographic information to incorporate into their recovery 
plans. 
It is unclear from the case whether any of the relationships between the impact 
communities and host communities were pre-planned or if all were hastily agreed to after 
the evacuation. The Okuma town disaster timeline indicates that cooperation with the 
Aizu Wakamatsu municipal government began April 6, 2011. Once established, the 
arrangements promote community cohesiveness by facilitating placement of Okuma’s 
residents in temporary lodging near the temporary municipal offices, schools, and senior 
centers. The host communities serve as central locations for recovery planning and other 
informational meetings. 
All plans reviewed for this case study include vision statements prioritizing the re-
establishment of the communities in Fukushima. National special legislation and plans 
also emphasize the desire to bring back communities. The prerogative of residents and 
business owners to set the direction of their recovery gets far less attention in official 
documents. A Tohoku University assessment of all 3/11 disaster impacted municipality 
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planning indicates that some level of citizen involvement occurred in all community 
planning, but due to municipal inexperience was only perfunctory or represented only 
small population segments in a number of cases.214 Balancing a desire for retaining 
community cohesiveness with residents’ self-determination has proven not to be an easy 
task in Fukushima or the other tsunami-struck communities. 
Table 2.   Recovery Planning and Management Structure Key Practices 
Summary 
 
C. KEY PRACTICES—FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
On the whole, TEPCO’s compensation system appears to be functioning 
efficiently. The Dispute Reconciliation Committee has provided a third party check and 
balance system for compensation decisions. The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency issued a report in 2012 which praised the 
Reconciliation Committee’s role in facilitating smooth payment through its guidelines 
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Key Practice Government Level Observations 
Participatory recovery planning Central, Prefectural, 
Municipal 
Recovery visions and 
priorities nationally and for 
each locality; stakeholder 
involvement 
Separate, new Reconstruction 
Agency 
Central Centralized recovery 
management; criticism of 
slow bureaucracy continues 
Surveys of relocated residents Prefectural, 
Municipal 
Improved information flow 
between residents and 
communities for planning 
Arrangements with host 
communities 
Municipal Keeps community members 
together; gathering place 
for community meetings 
Balance community 




Official support for both 
retaining communities and 
support of livelihoods; 
some residents feel 
pressured to return 
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and Center for Dispute Resolution.215 A few disputed cases have landed in the courts 
with substantial awards. The media has reported several cases of dissatisfied 
claimants.216 The media has also reported perceptions that compensation recipients have 
less incentive to seek work and choose to frequent gambling establishments instead.217 
The concern that compensation payments create a disincentive for evacuees to 
find new work harkens back to descriptions of a “dependency culture” developing after 
Chernobyl.218 The extended displacements have an enormous impact on residents’ ability 
to continue working or find new work and maintain an independent livelihood. Research 
based on surveys of Fukushima evacuees indicates that “location specific investments” 
prior to the disaster, such as a job that is tied to a particular location, have proved to be a 
disadvantage for evacuees during displacement. Those with more mobile jobs (e.g., 
salaried employees of a larger company with multiple sites) and lifestyles (e.g., renters 
versus homeowners) have found it easier to reestablish a stable livelihood elsewhere. 
Many previously full time workers have only found part-time work in their relocation 
community.219 Despite a robust subsidy system, those dependent on local small 
businesses have been stymied by the delays in rebuilding while local governments 
determine new land use policies and develop recovery plans.220 
TEPCO’s financial compensation framework is supported through a government 
chartered corporation. The arrangement facilitates government bonds and bank financing 
to ensure TEPCO has adequate funding to support compensation, remediation, and 
decommissioning costs. By July 2012, the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation 
Corporation owned over 50 percent of TEPCO shares, “effectively nationalizing” the 
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company.221 The government has provided additional interest free loans as the accident 
related costs have increased. 
Though the Reconciliation Committee recommended compensation in March 
2012 for lost real estate value in the affected areas, TEPCO’s process to discuss 
implementation schemes with affected municipalities and residents lasted a full year. The 
Reconciliation Committee and the central government announced a significant expansion 
in November 2013 that signaled a major shift in policy to provide substantial support for 
residents to relocate permanently. Large natural disasters can result in displacement of 
homes and businesses for several years, and many tsunami survivors are still living in 
temporary housing while communities rebuild outside the tsunami zones. The difference 
for the residents in areas like Namie and Futuba is the uncertainty that their community 
will ever be safe for reoccupancy. The uncertainty is a major source of distress and a 
hindrance for people to re-establish livelihoods. 
Table 3.   Financial Support Key Practices Summary 
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Key Practice Government Level Observations 
Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee 
Central Buffer between affected parties 
and TEPCO; Detailed 
Guidelines; Compensation for 
psychological distress and 
evacuation costs early; 
Reduced court actions 
Central government 
financial backing for 
TEPCO 
Central Ensures financial support for 
TEPCO compensation; 
Government/taxpayers bearing 
costs at least for near term 
Payment for real estate loss 




Recommended March 2012, 
implemented March 2013, 
expanded December 2013; 
negotiations with local 
governments may have slowed 
implementation 
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D. KEY PRACTICES—TEMPORARY HOUSING 
Japan has applied many lessons learned after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, 
particularly related to providing temporary housing for displaced residents. In addition to 
the more typical disaster public housing and prefabricated units, the prefectures provide 
sublets of rental units and locally built wooden structures using central government 
funding. With 330,000 people displaced nationwide, the additional options were critically 
needed. By November 2011, over 17,000 people were still staying with family or friends, 
but the vast majority (over 310,000) were in some form of temporary housing.222  
Every form of temporary housing has drawbacks to be considered. While sublets 
tend to be nicer units, they are dispersed and mostly in cities. Many temporary units were 
not built to last longer than two years in the surrounding climate and pose substantial 
repair requirements after three plus years of use and weather exposure. Disaster public 
housing complexes are often not desirable for residents from rural villages and create a 
permanent management burden for local governments.223  
What if Japan and Fukushima Prefecture had taken a more radical approach and 
not focused on providing temporary housing for the residents from the “difficult to return 
zone”? By concentrating scarce resources and attention on providing temporary housing, 
officials made a deliberate policy choice not to focus on facilitating permanent 
relocations for those who face a minimum of five years out of their homes. No doubt this 
policy direction is in deference to municipal leaders from the restricted zones and 
consistent with the Design Council’s original principles to maintain communities. This 
exposes a fundamental tension between what a community needs to stay together and 
rebuild, and what an individual might prefer to accelerate his or her own recovery. 
 
 
                                                 
222 Reconstruction Agency, Government of Japan, Current Situations of Evacuees in the Aftermath of 
the Earthquake (by Prefectures and by Facilities), 2011, 
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/current_situation_of_evacuees.pdf  
223 Shiozaki, “Housing Reconstruction and Community Development,” 64–71  
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Table 4.   Temporary Housing Key Practices Summary 
 
E. KEY PRACTICES—OFFSITE REMEDIATION 
For the purposes of the identified scope, this study focuses on the key practices 
related to overall remediation decision making that affects the community relocations and 
less on technical issues and methods. Risk communication and stakeholder involvement, 
an essential element of offsite remediation strategy, is discussed in Section A. 
The central government’s decision to divide remediation responsibilities with the 
municipal governments has minimized the burden on the local governments that likely 
have limited technical expertise. The central government is providing technical advisory 
support and funding to the prefectures and municipalities managing the remediation in 
the Intensive Contamination Survey Areas. This has allowed the central government to 
focus its efforts to oversee the work in the 11 municipalities of the Special 
Decontamination Area. 
To an outsider it may seem counter intuitive to focus disaster recovery efforts in 
the less affected areas. Particularly after a disaster involving contamination, but also after 
large natural disasters, this strategy enables leaders to prioritize resources to accomplish 
the most good in the shortest time. It takes fewer resources to return more people to an 
area that had lower radiation readings at the outset. This strategy also takes advantage of 
natural decay to reduce levels in the areas with highest concentrations. Additionally, 
remediation workers would accumulate maximum radiation dose more quickly in areas 
with higher radiation levels. 
Key Practice Government Level Observations 
Expanded housing options Central, Prefectural, 
Municipal 
Faster transition from shelters 
to temporary housing; small 
units separate extended 
families 
Long term use of temporary 
structures 
Prefectural, Municipal Unit deterioration and 
significant maintenance 
requirements.  
Policy emphasis on provision 
of temporary housing 
Central, Prefectural Resources not directed to 
facilitate permanent relocation 
for those desiring to move. 
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One of the potential benefits of a zoned prioritization of recovery work in the less 
affected areas is the opportunity to support residents and businesses who choose to 
relocate permanently once fully informed of the situation. Though the Dispute 
Reconciliation Committee made recommendations in March 2012 in this direction, it 
appears that stance may not have been fully embraced by the central and local 
governments. As would be expected, municipal leaders are motivated to keep their 
communities together and likely pushed back on suggestions to facilitate independent 
relocation for residents. Until late 2013, it was unthinkable for public officials to speak 
publicly of permanent relocations.224 
Some local officials and outside experts view the central government’s original 
Decontamination Roadmap as unrealistic. The schedule delays have resulted in 
disappointment and frustration for community leaders, residents, and businesses. The 
planners may have not accounted adequately for the identification and preparation of 
temporary storage sites for the contaminated materials generated during cleanup 
operations.  
Storage sites for contaminated materials are inevitably controversial. 
Communities and residents are wary that the temporary leases will be extended due to 
difficulties identifying and preparing new permanent disposal locations. For communities 
trying to lure residents and businesses back to the area, a temporary storage site 
diminishes the vision of the community they hope to project. The Japanese central 
government ultimately offered subsidies to convince Fukushima Prefecture and the towns 
of Okuma and Futuba to accept temporary storage sites in the areas closest to the plant. 
As noted by the IAEA decontamination mission team, Japanese efforts to conduct 
demonstration projects to test and compare remediation and dose management methods 
are yielding benefits. One example resulted in a simpler, less expensive method for 
decontaminating agricultural land. Also, IAEA recommended further study of the use of 
personal dosimeter measurement versus estimated dose based on environmental readings 
alone to support late-phase decision making. 
                                                 
224 “Debate Begins for Governments over Ishiba’s no-Return Remark,” The Asahi Shimbun.  
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Table 5.   Offsite Remediation Key Practices Summary 
 
F. KEY PRACTICES—COMMUNITY RESETTLEMENT 
The zoned approach to remediation has enabled communities to phase their 
reoccupancy by initially reestablishing portions of the evacuated communities as base 
settlements to support remediation and decommissioning work. New hotels, restaurants, 
and hardware stores have either opened or reopened to support the needs of 
decontamination workers moving into the area.225 The benefit of this approach is that 
communities can retain an active core to build upon as the radiation levels are reduced 
and restrictions are lifted. It provides some small businesses from the community a 
location to re-establish themselves near their original customer base. Time will tell if 
these temporary economies are sustainable. It will be useful to monitor how well the 
                                                 
225 Sam Harnett, “Not Everyone Wants the Clean-Up in Fukushima to be Over,” Public Radio 
International, October 15, 2014, http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-15/not-everyone-wants-clean-
fukushima-be-over  
Key Practice Government Level Observations 
Divided responsibilities 
central and local 
governments based on 
severity of contamination 
Central, Prefectural, 
Municipal 
Reduced burden on local 
governments 
Prioritized decontamination 
of areas with lower radiation 
levels 
Central Focused effort in lower level 
areas to support earlier 
reoccupancy; missed 
opportunity to facilitate early 
permanent relocations from 
most contaminated areas 
Central government 
subsidies for municipalities 




Provided after lengthy 
negotiations; temporary site 
identification delayed 
remediation  
Demonstration projects to 
assess and compare methods 
Central, Prefectural, 
Municipal 
Prioritizes resources for proven 
methods; lower cost methods 
identified for some purposes 
Study to assess use of 
personal dosimeter 
measurements to support 
late phase decision making 
Central, Prefectural, 
Municipal 
Mixed reactions from local 
officials, experts, and media; 
study ongoing 
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communities are able to transition to a traditional economy and society after 
decontamination and decommissioning work reduces and ends. 
Table 6.   Community Resettlement Key Practices Summary 
 
G. APPLICABILITY TO THE U.S. POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
How well would the key practices from Japan’s experience managing relocation 
and recovery work in the U.S.? Are there modifications that would make the practices 
work better in the U.S. compared to Japan? Are similar practices already adequately 
included in U.S. guidance, plans, and exercises? The sections below discuss how the 
types of key practices identified in the Japan case might be impacted by differences in the 
U.S., based on: 1) political and governmental structure, including existing plans and 
guidance; and 2) geographical and cultural considerations. 
1. Political and Governmental Structure 
The U.S. federal structure is similar to Japan’s, though the state roles and 
authorities are much stronger and broader than the Japanese prefectures. Under the U.S. 
federal system of government, offsite impacts would be managed primarily by the local 
and state governments with significant advice and support from federal agencies. Because 
of the technical expertise and equipment requirements, a radiological disaster would 
involve more federal teams and support than a natural disaster would. Most of the 
practices discussed above could be applied within the U.S. federal system with minimal 
modifications. 
Key Practice Government Level Observations 
Staged reoccuppancy to 
support remediation and 
decommissioning 
Municipal Capitalizes on localized, 
disaster-based economic 
boom; some businesses able to 
reopen and/or change model 
for new customer base; keeps 
community active and 
functioning 
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a. Nuclear Liability and Compensation in the U.S. 
In the U.S., compensation for bodily injury and property damage or loss caused 
by a nuclear power plant accident is governed by the Price Anderson Act. The Act limits 
liability for nuclear plant operators and associated suppliers and transporters while 
ensuring that a large pool of insurance funds are available to pay offsite costs (survivor 
compensation, decontamination, etc.) in the event of an accident.226 The tiered insurance 
pool under the Act currently totals just under $13 billion coverage per event.  
The American Nuclear Insurers is the organization that manages the insurance 
pool for nuclear power plant operators. Their Frequently Asked Questions brochure 
published in June 2014 lists typical costs that may be covered if warranted for the 
situation based on official evacuation orders, such as: transportation, lodging, emergency 
medical treatment, property damage, and lost wages for individuals; loss of revenue, 
contaminated agricultural products, and property loss for businesses; and the additional 
costs of state and local governments for police services, transportation, shelter due to 
imminent risk to public safety from a nuclear plant accident. The brochure lists the 
following specific exclusions: evacuation costs of persons living outside the designated 
evacuation area; loss of business revenue outside a reasonable area based on the 
evacuation zones; losses due to theft or looting; transportation accidents during 
evacuation; and losses due to acts of war (though terrorist acts are covered).227 
If the full pool is depleted, Congress would determine whether additional disaster 
assistance is required to pay excess costs. As of February 2015, TEPCO has paid out 
three times the $13 billion limit just for compensation to individuals and businesses.228 
Unlike Japanese law which specifies unlimited liability for the plant operator, the 
operator is not liable above this limit in the U.S. This means that if a Fukushima scale 
accident occurred in the U.S., compensation and cleanup costs above $13 billion would 
                                                 
226 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also require operators to retain insurance for 
onsite cleanup costs. 
227 American Nuclear Insurers, Emergency Response: Some Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, 
2014, http://nuclearinsurance.com/library/ANI_FAQ_Brochure.pdf  
228 Tokyo Electric Power Company, “Records of Applications and Payouts for Indemnification.”  
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not be paid by the plant operator or their insurer and Congress would be expected to step 
in. 
Though the Act does not include a dispute reconciliation committee system 
similar to Japan’s, it does require federal district court prioritization and management of 
compensation after 15 percent of the available pool has been expended.229 The 
uncertainties built in to the Price Anderson Act system almost guarantee assistance delays 
and frustration for survivors. Disaster recovery planners do not know how the limited 
insurance pool would be prioritized after a major offsite event or what type and how 
much assistance Congress might provide if necessary. The Fukushima accident prompted 
calls for Congress to clarify these points under Price-Anderson.230 After four years and 
headlines long since dimmed, legislative action seems unlikely. 
b. U.S. Planning Guidance and Gaps 
Updated in 2013 to incorporate some Fukushima lessons, the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for 
Radiological Incidents (PAG Manual) provides direction for the radiation management 
aspects of a disaster involving widespread nuclear/radiological contamination. The 
manual provides recommended criteria (specific radiation dose limits) for implementing 
protective actions in the early and intermediate phases such as population evacuation and 
extended relocation. For the late phase, the PAG Manual outlines a decision making 
process rather than a specific target dose level, noting the specifics of the situation and 
the community’s input is necessary for the late phase decisions. The manual emphasizes 
the necessity and importance of community involvement in the decision making process 
regarding setting cleanup priorities, determining cleanup levels and procedures, timing 
                                                 
229 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief,” 
accessed February 20, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/nuclear-
insurance.html  
230 Ryan Morhard, and Sanjana Ravi, “The Price-Anderson Act and the Role of Congress in 
Compensating Victims After a Catastrophic Nuclear Disaster,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 4 (2012): 343.  
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for reoccupancy, and waste storage and disposal locations.231 The Department of Energy 
(DOE) Operational Guidelines provide more technical detail including calculation of stay 
times for responders and public reentry to retrieve possessions or maintain property.232 
The Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual includes 
“Planning Standard M: Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-Accident Operations.” 
The planning standard advises states and local governments to include in their 
radiological emergency plans procedures for coordinating relocation and temporary 
reentry and permanent return into the area. Specific details about the content of these 
procedures and the complexities for extended relocation periods are not included. The 
planning standard refers to the PAG Manual for technical guidance.233 
The Department of Homeland Security published Key Planning Factors for 
Recovery from a Radiological Terrorism Incident as a draft guide in follow up to pilot 
regional planning initiatives in 2012. This document identifies unique issues of a 
radiological disaster during the short, intermediate, and long term recovery phases. 
Designed as a supplement to general disaster recovery planning guidance, it also 
emphasizes managing the technical aspects of radiological contamination. The Key 
Planning Factors document is particularly useful for framing the public information and 
stakeholder involvement issues and making the case for establishing communications 
plans and pre-designated stakeholder working groups during pre-incident planning. It 
also explains the major elements to include in contaminated debris management 
planning.234 
                                                 
231 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning 
Guidance for Radiological Incidents,” 2013, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/pags.html#pags  
232 Charley Yu et al., Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines Developed for use in Emergency 
Preparedness and Response to a Radiological Dispersal Device Incident (Argonne, IL: Argonne National 
Laboratory, 2009).  
233 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 
Manual, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/32780?fromSearch=fromsearch&id=7576  
234 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Key Planning Factors: For Recovery from a 
Radiological Terrorism Incident,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/31723.  
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The PAG Manual, REP Program Manual, and Key Planning Factors documents 
appropriately focus on the radiation management decisions that local, state, and federal 
leaders will make. They are designed for the audience of the radiation protection 
professional rather than the lay decision maker. This leaves a guidance gap for local 
community leaders who must manage the larger disaster recovery, including both the 
radiation management aspects as well as support for relocated residents and businesses 
and reconstruction of damaged buildings and infrastructure. Local leaders require 
decision guidance designed for them that addresses the full range of issues they will face 
after a radiological disaster in an integrated manner. The 2014 NCRP Report No. 175, as 
well as additional observations from the Fukushima disaster recovery will be a useful 
resource for such guidance. 
Open and transparent communication with the public throughout the development 
and execution of cleanup strategies is a critical function for local governments. EPA, 
FEMA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have published public information/risk 
communication guides for radiological disaster response and early recovery. These 
include: Communicating Radiation Risks Crisis Communications for Emergency 
Responders; Communicating During and After a Nuclear Power Plant Incident; and 
Improvised Nuclear Device Response and Recovery: Communicating in the Immediate 
Aftermath.235 All of these provide local officials guidance for the early phase and reentry 
after different types of radiological incidents. Basic risk communication practices 
identified in the Japan case, such as establishing trust and using varied means of 
communication are addressed. However, the guides do not address the complex public 
interactions that will be necessary to manage extended relocation situations after 
widespread offsite contamination occurs. 
                                                 
235 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Communicating Radiation Risks,” 2007, 
http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/basic/info_prod.html;  
Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, Communicating during and after a 
Nuclear Power Plant Incident, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013, 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33011; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 




FEMA has published several all-hazards planning guidance documents that touch 
upon some of the key practices identified in the Japan case. FEMA’s 2009 Evacuee 
Support Planning Guide (FEMA P-760) is a planning guidebook for States or local 
governments to prepare to accept and support large numbers of evacuees from other 
communities and/or states.236 This Guide encourages states and communities to plan for 
managing an influx of evacuees with or without notice and if possible, in coordination 
with potential impact communities. It provides planning options for some of the issues 
discussed in the Japan case such as: tracking evacuees; decontamination for evacuees 
affected by radiological, chemical, or biological contamination; mitigating infrastructure 
and public service impacts due to increased user base; development of joint public 
information plans between both the impact and host community; coordinating social 
services benefits between jurisdictions; and preparing for return/reentry to impact 
community. Some of these recovery topics get minimal treatment and the perspective is 
mostly from the host community’s as opposed to the impact community’s role. Both 
perspectives are important. 
In 2012, FEMA published the Catastrophic Housing Annex to its Hurricane 
Plan.237 This annex is among the most recent of FEMA’s efforts to improve planning for 
temporary housing support in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Many of the issues 
regarding housing raised in the Japan case are addressed in this Annex. It includes an 
extensive selection of climate suitable options for temporary housing, with available 
rental housing in habitable areas near the impact zone as the most preferred. The Annex 
promotes the application of a zoned approach to providing housing focusing initial 
resources in the less damaged peripheral areas that is similar to the concept of offsite 
remediation prioritization in the Japan case. Radiological planners may not initially look 
to the Annex as a guide since it is tied to the Hurricane Plan. States and communities 
could use the options and guidance in the Annex for housing after any type of disaster, 
                                                 
236 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Evacuee Support Planning Guide, 2009, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/16941  
237 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Catastrophic Housing Annex, 2012, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/29218  
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including radiological. Inquiries at FEMA indicate that an all hazards version of the 
Annex is under development.  
FEMA’s 2007 Debris Management Guide, (FEMA-325) provides states and 
communities general guidance for planning debris management operations.238 It includes 
a brief reference to the additional complexities that radiological contamination would 
pose, but no specific planning guidance recommendations.  
All the best guidance and plans will not matter if the responsible officials are 
unaware they exist or have never practiced or even discussed with colleagues how they 
would be used after a real disaster. The EPA sponsored a full scale recovery phase 
radiological exercise called Liberty RadEx in 2010. A full scale nuclear recovery exercise 
is out of reach for most state and community budgets, but tabletops designed to probe the 
issues and decision points that arise months and years after a large disaster can be very 
useful for preparing leaders and testing partnership structures. There is a growing 
recognition within the emergency management community that more frequent and 
effective disaster recovery exercises are needed. The Government Accountability Office 
and the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General have both made 
recommendations for more recovery-focused exercises.239  
2. Geographical and Cultural 
Whereas the U.S. and Japan have relatively similar governmental and disaster 
management structures, from a geographical standpoint they are night and day. Both 
countries are subject to a wide variety of natural hazards, including earthquakes, 
hurricanes/typhoons, volcanoes, severe winter storms, landslides, and flooding. For 
Japan, however, large, deadly disasters are far more frequent because of its exposed, 
                                                 
238 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Debris Management Guide, 2007, 
https://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit/debris-management-guide  
239 Gene Aloise, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Actions Needed to Better Prepare to Recover from 
Possible Attacks using Radiological or Nuclear Materials (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010), http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/301288.pdf, 26; Richard L. Skinner, 
Assessment of Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Support Function Roles and 
Responsibilities (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 
2010), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-08_Nov10.pdf, 47.  
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compact situation atop four tectonic plates.240 Japan is essentially a cluster of islands of 
the Pacific coast of Russia, China, and Korea. Its land area is 377,887 square kilometers 
and its population is just under 127 million, with a density of 349 people per square km. 
The U.S., in contrast, has only 35 people per sq. kilometer and vast tracts of undeveloped 
land area.241 In addition, over 80 percent of the land in Japan is unsuitable for 
development because of the terrain, nearly 73 percent of which is mountainous. This has 
resulted in large, populous cities along the thin coastlines that make up 8 percent of the 
land area.242 
These geographic differences are critically important when comparing policy 
options related to relocation of communities and dealing with hazardous waste. High 
population density is linked with slower disaster recovery in part due to difficulties 
providing temporary housing.243  
Geographical considerations are not the only factors at play for recovery decision 
makers mulling temporary versus permanent relocation and how to deal with the waste, 
but they are significant. The bottom line is that Japan simply has less land suitable for 
development than the U.S. From this angle, it’s easy to understand why Japan is fighting 
to reclaim all of the land spoiled by the radiological contamination as quickly as possible. 
It is also easy to understand the quandary of what to do with the growing mountains of 
contaminated waste temporarily, let alone permanently.  
The politics surrounding community relocations related to public works and 
disaster hazards are traditionally very sensitive. Japan already has a somewhat ugly 
history of state coerced relocations of small, defenseless villages sitting in the way of 
                                                 
240 Peter Duus, “Dealing with Disaster,” in Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response 
and Recovery after Japan’s 3/11, ed. Jeff Kingston (New York: Routledge, 2012), 175.   
241 World Bank, “Population Density,” accessed January 23, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST ; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
Government of Japan, “Population Estimates by Age (5-Year Age Group) and Sex,” accessed March 1, 
2015, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/tsuki/index.htm  
242 “Japan Facts,” National Geographic, accessed January 23, 2015, 
http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/countries/japan-facts/; “Coastline Lengths,” World by Map, 
accessed January 23, 2015, http://world.bymap.org/Coastlines.html   
243 Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery, 13.  
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future dams the national government has planned to bolster the country’s limited 
freshwater resources.244 The U.S. has its own history with relocations for dams and 
ongoing divisiveness over sites for nuclear waste storage.  
A number of the key practices discussed here require fostering willing and 
supportive host communities for the large groups of displaced disaster survivors. In the 
immediate emergency phase after disasters, U.S. communities near and far are eager to 
offer help and take in evacuees. Hosting the influx of strangers for months and years is 
far less desirable. Social Capital researcher Aldrich describes temporary housing trailers 
in the U.S. as “public bads.” In other words, something that has broad public benefits but 
negative side effects for a small segment of the population. This is one aspect of the 
other, darker side of social capital that has been explored in both economic and sociology 
literature. Whether it be temporary housing or temporary waste storage, communities 
with high levels of social capital are better equipped to fight off the placement of “public 
bads” too near for comfort.245 
Sociologists have long held that American society is more individualistic 
compared to community oriented societies in East Asia.246 There are certainly pockets of 
close-knit communities dotted all over the U.S. landscape, many founded by immigrants 
who banded together to create small homes away from home. The Vietnamese-American 
Village de L’Est worked together closely to bring back their neighborhood more quickly 
than others after Hurricane Katrina soaked New Orleans.247 Residents of the Louisiana 
bayous are known to be deeply attached to their coastal homeland passed down for 
generations.248 Neighborhoods like these may not be open to accepting permanent 
relocation away from their home so easily even in the face of radiological contamination.  
                                                 
244 Daniel P. Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West (Ithaca, 
NYL Cornell University Press, 2008), 95–113.  
245 Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery, 134–147.  
246 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion 
(New York, New York: Random House LLC, 2013), 113.   
247 Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery, 131.   
248 David Burley et al., “Place Attachment and Environmental Change in Coastal Louisiana,” 
Organization & Environment 20, no. 3 (2007): 348.  
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On the whole, however, with no restrictions of movement among states, many 
U.S. cities and towns have relatively transient populations attracted by job opportunities 
or other reasons.249 In the post disaster environment, those with job mobility and limited 
property and social attachments in the area may prefer to move than wait out a lengthy 
cleanup process. When compared in that very broad sense, a policy of supporting self-
determination for residents to relocate permanently would be more likely to succeed in 
many parts of the U.S. than it would have in Japan. Such community and personal family 
decisions cannot be dictated and are never made lightly. Balancing residents’ self-
determination versus a community desire to stay together and rebuild is extremely 
difficult after any significant disaster. 
In the U.S., geographical and cultural factors will play out differently depending 
on the region affected, so it is difficult to make simple comparisons. No community 
wants to lose its tax base or worse yet completely dissolve itself by supporting permanent 
relocation of residents and businesses. No state wants to promote relocations that move 
residents and businesses (and therefore tax revenue) out of state. No community is eager 
to accept a waste storage site for contaminated materials in its midst. At the same time, 
community leaders want to help their residents recover as quickly as possible, even if the 
individual’s path differs from the community’s. The U.S. has more land to work with 
than a country like Japan, perhaps enabling more feasible options for communities to 
consider in their recovery planning. 
H. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Table 7 summarizes the findings described above of the comparison of the key 
practices observed in the case study to the U.S. policy environment. Frequently the 
comparison to the U.S. environment is based on available guidance and plans. Further 
research would be necessary to determine how often these guidance documents are 
                                                 
249 David Ihrke, Reason for Moving: 2012 to 2013 (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-574.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, “Estimates of the Components of 
Resident Population Change: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013,” accessed January 23, 2015, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk   
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applied in practice and exercised, necessary components for true capability development. 
Chapter VI will outline the recommendations derived from these findings. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
We have to envisage the return of the next generation, even if we were not 
able to return. 
—Shiro Izawa, Mayor of Futaba, Japan250 
 
Can we forge something positive out of Fukushima’s catastrophe to improve 
disaster recovery readiness in the U.S.? How can the U.S. best capitalize on the lessons 
from Japan’s experience managing relocated communities and preparing for 
reconstruction and reoccupancy after a nuclear disaster?  
One of the most disheartening findings of this study is that government and 
TEPCO officials seemingly recognized a need to help the residents and business owners 
in the most contaminated areas move on, but for a variety of reasons allowed the 
bureaucratic process to drag on for years before providing definitive policy and financial 
support. It is clear that local and state officials in the U.S. also will not be eager to assist 
taxpaying residents move elsewhere and give up on the community’s future. There are no 
easy solutions for this agonizing situation. It is impossible to overstate how important and 
how underappreciated the public information management and stakeholder engagement 
capability is to the disaster recovery process, especially when widespread contamination 
is involved. What is possible, is for high risk communities to reduce the time required for 
such decision making after disaster by giving serious consideration to the existential 
threat such a hazard might pose and planning for structured, open, and frank discussions 
with the public to inform its recovery strategy.  
It is also possible—and advisable for the federal government to review the 
mechanisms available to support communities, individuals, and businesses in such a 
situation. Does it make sense to design a compensation system that requires court and 
congressional intervention as is currently the case under the Price-Anderson Act? If the 
Price-Anderson authority does not apply or is exceeded, are existing disaster assistance 
                                                 
250 “Debate Begins for Governments over Ishiba’s no-Return Remark,” The Asahi Shimbun.  
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authorities adequate to support long term or permanent relocations? What benefit is there 
to waiting for the catastrophe to occur before acting on these policy gaps? 
Possibly the easiest and least controversial next step to address the issues raised 
by this study is to incorporate the lessons Fukushima has provided into national guidance 
for radiological disaster recovery planning and management. Local and state 
governments will be at the center of the maelstrom if a significant radiological disaster 
happens here. They will be managing the recovery—and they will need help. 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
State and community leaders and planners have a clear need for national guidance 
that outlines anticipated disaster recovery decision points and related public information 
messaging requirements and strategies. Jurisdictions that neighbor high risk areas have an 
equal if not more pressing need to understand their potential role after a significant 
radiological disaster. Ideally, the guidance would integrate both radiation management 
and general recovery support for the full continuum from evacuation to resettlement. This 
would help all involved communities envision the planning needs to support long term 
evacuees while preparing for future reoccupancy. 
The following, more detailed recommendations highlight topics or key practices 
that emerge from this comparative analysis and represent gaps in current U.S. 
radiological disaster planning guidance. Based on the analysis in Chapter V, all of the 
suggested practices have basic applicability for the U.S. None are culturally or politically 
unique to the conditions in Japan. Combined with existing guidelines, the specific 
additions and or emphasis points below would provide more comprehensive planning 
support for communities and states. For ease of reference, the recommendations appear in 
the same order as the policy themes that frame Chapters IV and V. 
1. Communities should plan in advance to ensure evacuated residents are 
able to stay in contact with local officials and that local officials will be 
able to track and communicate directly with residents. This point is useful 
for all types of disasters that may result in extended displacement of large 
numbers of people. Current guidance discusses registries for health 
monitoring and/or tracking of evacuees who have special needs or receive 
transportation assistance. The need to establish and maintain contact 
111 
between the community and all residents during extended displacements 
for recovery support and planning purposes is not emphasized.  
2. State and national officials should prepare to provide public information 
about radiation and health to the media outlets and local officials in 
communities expected to host large concentrations of evacuees to help 
counteract discrimination and stigma against incoming evacuees. This 
point is briefly mentioned in the Evacuee Support Planning Guide, but 
could be strengthened and cross-referenced in other guidance documents 
specifically targeted to public information professionals. 
3. Public information and risk communication guidance should stress not 
only the importance of a trusted spokesperson, but the importance of 
strong personal engagement by the local executive leadership in the 
stakeholder involvement for late phase decision making and recovery 
planning process. 
4. As recommended by the University of Tokyo media research team, state 
and local officials should plan to provide in person radiation education 
seminars tailored to those living or working near the evacuation zones as 
well as evacuees as soon as the situation has stabilized.251 The seminars 
can serve multiple purposes, to educate the public more effectively about 
radiation risk and self-protection measures to reduce individual dose, as 
well as identifying populations that may require additional support. 
5. The population survey regimes developed by the prefectures and villages 
in Japan are a useful model for U.S. states and communities to incorporate 
needs and plans of individuals into community recovery planning. Current 
U.S. guidance focuses on health surveys only.  
6. Local jurisdictions should establish host community 
relationships/arrangements pre-disaster, including plans for temporary 
municipal offices and provision of significant community and social 
services such as schools, daycare, and eldercare to evacuees. 
7. Guidance should emphasize the importance of supporting self-
determination for individuals and families, yet offer strategies for gently 
promoting community resilience and cohesiveness during the period of 
temporary relocation. 
8. Local and state officials should delineate as early as possible areas where 
reoccupation will not be possible for a minimum of x years (e.g., three or 
five). They should establish mechanisms to facilitate permanent relocation 
at the earliest possible point for those who prefer not to wait in order to 
reduce uncertainty and anxiety.  
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9. The Catastrophic Housing Annex of FEMA’s Hurricane Plan would be 
more useful as an all hazards plan/annex that could be referenced in 
radiological planning guidance or plans. 
10. Guidance should more explicitly explain the relationship and tradeoffs 
between the cleanup decisions and storage and disposal options, including 
the time required to implement decisions.  
11. As IAEA recommended, from an early point officials should emphasize in 
public information and education forums the benefits of an iterative, 
strategic reduction of radiation dose over time as compared to the 
tradeoffs involved with setting a single, rigid, low dose target.252 
12. Local and state governments, particularly those located near nuclear power 
plants, should consider options for temporary storage and disposal of 
contaminated debris in their disaster debris management planning. The 
EPA PAG Manual provides guidance for contaminated debris disposal 
planning. FEMA should update its general debris planning guidance 
(Debris Management Guide, FEMA-325) to ensure consistency with the 
updated PAG Manual.  
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Given that the Fukushima recovery is relatively young with at least six more years 
of occupancy restrictions in some areas, we will have the opportunity to learn much more 
from the experience. This thesis has merely dipped into the myriad of complex disaster 
recovery issues and management strategies that are being discovered and tested in Japan. 
Five concepts mentioned in the case study that particularly warrant further study for 
potential U.S. policy consideration are: 1) the impact of the November 2013 policy shift 
to financially support property owners who buy homes elsewhere; 2) the establishment of 
a radiation dose range with a near term target of under 20 mSv/y for reoccupancy and a 
long term goal of 1 mSv/y; 3) the use of personal dosimeter measurement for supporting 
late phase decision making; 4) review of compensation guidelines to establish initial 
guidelines for future use in the U.S.; and 5) initial reestablishment of evacuated 
communities as base settlements to support remediation and decommissioning work. 
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1. Real Property Compensation Policy Impact 
For the property owners who had made up their minds to leave their home town 
permanently and resettle elsewhere, the November 2013 Cabinet decision to ensure 
compensation for 75 percent of the difference in the sales price was definitely a welcome 
event. It is not clear if the central government or prefecture or municipalities are tracking 
and monitoring the outcomes of these choices and ultimately, the policy. It is also unclear 
what will be done with the real estate left behind. It would be useful to track how many 
families and businesses accept this option and to what extent it affects the return 
population for the impacted communities. Follow up with the families could also yield 
information to compare the psycho-social impacts for those who permanently relocate 
versus those who wait and return. 
Potential research questions for study include: what is the correlation between the 
number of residents accepting the real estate compensation and the return population of 
the municipality over time; what is the disposition of the abandoned properties and what 
impacts do they have on neighborhoods over time; and how well do permanently 
relocated people cope as compared to those who remained in temporary lodgings 
awaiting return? 
2. Radiation Dose Range 
As discussed in the Literature Review, the ultimate question that planners struggle 
with for nuclear/radiological disaster recovery is “how clean is clean?” The Central 
Government of Japan made a relatively early decision to adopt the under 20 mSv/y dose 
range in order to enable the development of specific remediation and reoccupancy 
strategies for the affected communities. Current U.S. policy, as outlined in the EPA PAG 
Manual sets a PAG for the intermediate phase, recommending relocation of the public at 
or above 20 mSv in year one and 5 mSv for subsequent years. For the late phase, EPA 
recommends a site specific process to determine dose levels for reoccupation that are 
acceptable to the community. 
Future updates of the PAG Manual will benefit from monitoring and assessment 
of the implementation of the dose range in Japan from the perspective of how it affected 
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the reoccupancy. Potential research questions for study include: to what extent and how 
communities are able to successfully continue to reduce dose after initial reoccupation; 
how quickly community members demonstrate acceptance of the standards by moving 
back and reestablishing businesses in the areas opened for reoccupancy; and what public 
communication methods about community remediation and reoccupancy decisions and 
managing dose were most effective over time? 
3. Personal Dosimeters for Estimating Future Dose 
Chapter IV, Section D describes efforts by Japanese officials to transition from 
estimating dose for the purposes of making remediation and reoccupancy decisions based 
solely on environmental readings to using individual dosimeter readings. Currently, this 
concept is not addressed in the EPA PAG Manual or the DOE Operational Guidelines.  
U.S. policy will benefit from monitoring and evaluating the potential benefits of 
these methods that are the object of ongoing studies in Japan. Potential research questions 
include: what are the actual benefits in terms of reduced relocation durations and 
remediation costs; at what point in the remediation planning and implementation process 
is the transition to individual dose measurement most feasible and effective; and what are 
the most successful means of explaining this change of method to the public? 
4. Compensation Guidelines 
Japan’s Dispute Reconciliation Committee has developed detailed, carefully 
considered guidelines for TEPCO’s compensation for nuclear damages. The law 
authorizing the Reconciliation Committee existed prior to 2011. The Committee 
benefited from the work of the Reconciliation Committee set up to address compensation 
after the 1999 criticality incident at Tokaimura that had only completed its work the year 
prior.253 The scope of the Fukushima accident far exceeded that of Tokaimura, so the 
new Committee of respected lawyers, scientists, health professionals has spent 
considerable effort and time developing and supplementing the compensation guidelines 
between 2011 and December 2013. This necessary work to review and assess the various 
                                                 
253 Nuclear Energy Agency, Japan’s Compensation System for Nuclear Damage, 22.  
115 
forms of damages in order to make equitable determinations has resulted in delays in the 
actual compensation payments. 
U.S. policymakers could invest time and effort now to review the Japanese 
guidelines in comparison with the current planned compensation framework of the 
American Nuclear Insurers, the entity that would make compensation payments if a U.S. 
nuclear plant accident occurred.254 Potential research questions include: what gaps in 
types of compensation coverage exist; what is the transition plan between the insurance 
coverage and the subsequent Court administered compensation; is there an accident 
scenario threshold that may warrant a more expedient progression to court and/or 
congressional action to facilitate timely compensation; and what are the potential benefits 
and/or hurdles to establishing a third party oversight or dispute resolution mechanism? 
This pre-incident effort could ensure that residents and businesses would not need 
to wait for years for decisions about the types and amounts of compensation to be 
provided. This topic is included as a recommendation for further study because it has 
complex legal implications to be considered. 
5. Staged Reoccupancy in “Base Settlements” 
In its first draft revitalization plan of March 2012, the town of Okuma determined 
it would focus remediation efforts in the least contaminated area of Okawara and resettle 
it first as a base community to support the decontamination and decommissioning work 
(see Chapter IV, Section E). Okuma’s experience implementing this idea is still in early 
stages. It will be useful to monitor and document the successes and lessons of this 
approach over the next 10 to 50 years. 
The U.S. could include a detailed case study of the Okawara base settlement as a 
means for staging the reoccupancy of Okuma in future planning guidance. Potential 
research questions for study include: does Okawara attract former residents and 
businesses of Okuma as well as temporary workers; what strategies for counteracting 
stigma related to the base settlement are most effective; and how well does Okawara and 
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Okuma overall recover as the decontamination and decommissioning work supporting the 
local economy diminishes? 
C. CONCLUSION 
It only takes a brief look at the blog of Mayor Endo of Kawauchi to know that he 
instinctively knew much of what he needed to do as the leader of his community after the 
3/11 disaster. He has been the champion for keeping his community together and 
rebuilding and returning as quickly as possible. Still, even a well-seasoned public 
manager would ask for guidance and best practices for addressing the overwhelming 
challenges he has faced after the Fukushima meltdown. Shepherding a community 
through an extended period of involuntary relocation due to radiological contamination 
requires that local officials understand the fundamentals of highly technical issues, 
standards, and data to support complicated recovery decisions. At the same time, they 
must understand and support the basic needs of citizens and businesses and how these 
interrelate with the radiation hazard impacting the community. 
Disaster survivors need leaders who value the kind of interactive exchange of 
information that the National Academies envisioned when it redefined risk 
communication in 1989.255 Open communication and engagement between the 
community members, leaders, and technical experts provides a path to make the kind of 
difficult decisions widespread contamination would compel. Survivors need leaders who 
will understand and carefully consider the long term implications of policy options for 
the community as well as its residents and businesses—even when they diverge. These 
themes must be at the center of any program of guidance and training for managing 
radiological disaster recovery. 
With all the requirements and burdens community leaders face just to manage day 
to day affairs of local government, it may be optimistic to expect they will also prepare 
for recovery from a low frequency/high impact nuclear disaster. In the U.S., communities 
within a ten mile radius of nuclear power plants prepare, train for, and exercise 
emergency plans for radiological accidents. Logic would imply that if it is enough of a 
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risk to warrant preparing for responding to a radiological disaster, then preparation for the 
recovery is prudent also. Experience demonstrates, however, that preparedness for 
recovery tends to be a lower priority for communities when allocating scarce resources. 
Outside those communities closest to nuclear power plants, most small to moderately 
sized communities’ expertise for managing radiation hazards will be limited to the fire 
department’s hazardous materials team and perhaps a specially trained staff at the 
regional hospital. For both response and recovery, it is reasonable to assume most 
communities, even those with nuclear power plants nearby, will require additional 
technical support from the state and federal government if a radiological incident occurs. 
Guidance and job aids for the intermediate and late phase (recovery) are all the 
more critical since community preparedness in advance is likely to be limited. If an 
incident were to occur, federal and state officials must be prepared to provide “just in 
time” training and technical assistance for local leaders based on pre-prepared 
intermediate and late phase decision making guidance. 
As with all emergency preparedness, we hope to never need to put our efforts to 
prepare for nuclear/radiological disasters into real practice. The plight of the communities 
surrounding Fukushima Daiichi reminds us that we must be ready all the same.  
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